The question arises: why should bourgeois states treat the Soviet socialist state more gently and more good-neighbourly than any other bourgeois state? Why should they send into the rear of the Soviet Union fewer spies, wreckers, saboteurs and assassins than they send into the rears of allied bourgeois states? Where did you come up with such a notion? Is it not more accurate, from the perspective of Marxism, to suppose that bourgeois states might dispatch into the rear of the Soviet Union two or three times more wreckers, spies, saboteurs and assassins than into the rear of any bourgeois state?

Is it not clear that so long as capitalist encirclement exists there will also be among us wreckers, spies, saboteurs and assassins dispatched into our rear by agents of foreign states? I.V. Stalin, 3 March 1937

Perhaps the most distinctive category in Stalinist policing of the 1930s is the symbol of vrag naroda — ‘enemy of the people’ — and its ready adaptation to the evolving (re-)conceptualization of Stalinist enemies. Vragi — ‘enemies’ — was a label applied as easily to descendants of the exploitative classes of the pre-revolutionary era — nobles, bourgeoisie, clerics, right-wing intellectuals — as it was after 1928 to industrial ‘wreckers’ (vrediteli), kulaks (‘wealthy peasants’) and their podkulachnik accomplices, Trotskyites (‘Left-Wing Deviationists’) and Bukharinites (‘Right-Wing Revisionists’). Vragi naroda became the catch-all to include all forms of anti-Soviet (anti-Stalinist) thought, predilection, or action.

I would like to express my thanks to the Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation, which has generously supported this research. I am grateful to the following archivists and scholars who provided assistance in Russian and American research collections: S.V. Mironenko and V.A. Kozlov in the State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF); the staff of the Russian State Military Archive (RGVA); and David Van Tassel, William Cunliffe and Larry McDonald in the National Archives at College Park, Maryland. An early draft of this paper was presented in the Borderlands Seminar at Brown University’s Watson Institute. I am grateful to Omer Bartov, Abbott Gleason and others for the very insightful discussion. Thanks are also due to Perry Biddiscombe, Carl Boyd, David Brandenberger, Richard Breitman, J. Arch Getty, Tom Havens, Hiroaki Kuromiya, Terry Martin, Jared McBride, Douglas Northrop, Patrick Osborn, Dieter Pohl, Gábor Rittersporn, Timothy Snyder, David Stone, Kazbek Sultanov and Lynne Viola. Special thanks to Suhnaz Yilmaz, Michael Reynolds and to Dickran Kouymjian and his network of Armenian scholars who generously helped me to track details of the post-1922 biography of Nuri Pasha Killigil. Finally, thanks to Bill Nelson for producing the map of Chechnya.

1 I.V. Stalin, ‘O nedostatakh partiinoi raboty i merakh likvidatsii Trotskistskikh i inykh dvurushnikov. Doklad na Plenum TsK VKP(b) 3 marta 1937 goda’, RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 1084, ll. 1–34.
2 J. Arch Getty and Oleg V. Naumov, The Road to Terror: Stalin and the Self-Destruction of
Under conditions of ‘capitalist encirclement’, intrinsic in the evolving concept of *vragi naroda* was the inseparable interconnectedness of domestic enemies with foreign ones: a ‘wrecker’ was not just a domestic saboteur, but also — wittingly or unwittingly — an agent of foreign interventionism. Gábor Rittersporn introduced the phrase ‘omnipresent conspiracy’ to describe this all-encompassing notion of Stalinism under siege, the pro-active scapegoating of enemies, real or imagined, that sustained a permanent siege mentality among the Stalinist leadership of the 1930s.3

This scapegoating of ‘enemies’ — foreign and domestic — became an intrinsic part of Stalinist popular culture. At the Moscow show trials, 1936–8, Chief Soviet Prosecutor Andrei Vyshinskii berated ‘enemies’ with abusive language, referring to the accused as ‘bandits’; ‘scoundrels’; ‘despicable adventurers trying to trample down the fragrant flowers in our socialist garden with their filthy feet’. Vyshinskii lambasted these ‘enemies’ of the Soviet people as ‘liars and buffoons, despicable pygmies, pug dogs and puppies raging like elephants’; ‘arch-scoundrels’; ‘disgusting creatures’. The conspirators were ‘a foul-smelling heap of human excrement’; ‘the most inveterate, the most arrant and decayed dishonest elements’; ‘the despicable bunch of adventurers’; ‘mad dogs’; ‘vermin’. Bukharin was ‘a wretched cross between a fox and a pig’. Trotsky was always ‘that Judas’ Trotsky.4

Such highly publicized rituals of vilification served not just to excoriate the enemies of Stalinism, but also to discourage dissent and simultaneously to whip up popular support for Stalinist hyper-vigilance, to encourage popular participation in the search for ‘enemies’ within.5 Stalinist culture of the 1930s was driven by two main features: side by side with the celebration of Soviet socialist accomplishments was the anathematization of ‘enemies’.6

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4 On the rhetoric used to anathematize *vragi*, see Arkady Vaksberg, *Prosecutor and the Prey: Vyshinsky in the 1930s’ Moscow Show Trials* (London 1990), 107–9.


6 Lewis Siegelbaum and Andrei K. Sokolov (eds), *Stalinism as a Way of Life: A Narrative in Documents* (New Haven, CT 2000).
In his path-breaking article on the ‘Origins of Soviet Ethnic Cleansing’ Terry Martin has shown how the concept of \textit{vragi} evolved in the 1930s away from traditional Marxist-Leninist class-based categories towards ethnically defined enemies, a re-conceptualization that was used to justify the Soviet terror against national minorities. Deportation policies that had previously been restricted to narrow Soviet ‘border regions’ (from 1923) and to class enemies (the dekulakization during the first Five-Year Plan) were ethnicized by the mid-1930s, as Soviet xenophobia merged with the vilification of ‘unreliable elements’, ‘suspect nations’ and ‘nationalities of foreign governments’ — all of which came to be synonymous with the Soviet Union’s own ‘diaspora nationalities’: minority ethnic groups, especially those in borderland regions, with strong religious, cultural and kinship ties to foreign peoples or states.

The fundamental reorientation of the Stalin terror towards foreign espionage elements came on 25 July 1937, with NKVD Resolution No. 00439:

Reliable informants and [police] investigatory materials have recently proven that the German General Staff and the Gestapo in wide measures are organizing espionage and sabotage work in the most important defence industry establishments, utilizing for this goal specially placed cadres of German extraction.

Secret informers among German subjects who are currently active in wrecking and sabotage [confirm that] main attention has been given to the organization of sabotage activities during wartime, and it is with these goals that the cadres of saboteurs are being trained.

This reorientation towards foreign enemies inevitably brought into focus the question of ‘fifth columnists’: active agents and saboteurs operating inside the Soviet Union. Moscow sent a clear signal to expand operations from suspected German spies and saboteurs to other nationalities on 9 August 1937 with NKVD Order No. 00485, ‘Regarding Measures to Protect the USSR from the Penetration of Spy, Terrorist, and Saboteur Elements’. The order focused in particular on ‘the subversive activity of Polish intelligence’ on Soviet soil that ‘has been conducted, and is still being conducted, openly and with impunity’ from Soviet secret police operations. From this point on, there emerged a new

7 Terry Martin, ‘The Origins of Soviet Ethnic Cleansing’, \textit{Journal of Modern History} 70(4) (December 1998), 813–61. On Stalinist sanctions against ethnically defined unreliable elements — ‘enemy nations’ — see 852–8. Notably, the Stalin terror disproportionately targeted diaspora nationalities of foreign states, especially when these were concentrated in Soviet borderland regions. Stateless diasporas — Jews, Assyrians, Gypsies — were not targeted as ‘enemy nations’.

8 See the full text of NKVD Order No. 00439, dated 25 July 1937, in \textit{Leningradskii Martirolog}, 1937–1938 (St Petersburg 1996), II: 452–3. Note that the ‘authoritative’ and ‘comprehensive’ inventory of NKVD orders failed to include in its list either Order No. 00439 or 00485, despite the fact that the full text of both ‘secret’ orders had already been published elsewhere. V.A. Kozlov and S.V. Mironenko (eds), \textit{Prikazy NKVD SSSR, 1934–1941 gg. Katalog rassekrechennykh dokumentov Gosudarstvennogo arkhiva Rossiiskoi Federatsii} (Novosibirsk 1999).

9 The full text of Order No. 00485, ‘O merakh, ogranzhdaushchikh SSSR ot proniknoveniia shpionskikh, terroristicheskikh i diversionnykh elementov’, dated 8 August 1937, was published in \textit{Leningradskii Martirolog}, 1937–1938, II: 454–6. The order was extended and expanded by order of N. Ezhov on 31 January 1938. See the published text of the order in Svetlana Alieva (ed.),
category of ‘enemy nations’, where Soviet police organs targeted ‘diaspora nationalities . . . exclusively based on their national identity’. These ‘national operations’ of the NKVD initially focused on the ‘destruction of espionage and sabotage contingents made up of Poles, Latvians, Germans, Estonians, Finns, Greeks, Iranians, Kharbintsy, Chinese, and Romanians, both foreign subjects and Soviet citizens’. In this way, ‘the Great Terror had evolved into an ethnic terror’.

The notion of vragi as fifth columnists, agents of foreign enemies operating inside the Soviet Union, was always closely associated with ‘enemies of the people’. Stalinist conceptions of ‘enemies’ excluded any possibility of legitimate anti-Stalinist or separatist social movements, which were reduced to nothing more than quislings of foreign enemies. The war against vragi was marked by a visceral disdain, an unmitigated anathematization of the enemies of the Soviet people. Georgii Dimitrov noted in his diary Stalin’s own words in a toast before a very exclusive group of his inner circle at a lunch celebrating the twentieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, dated 7 November 1937:

Anyone who endeavours to wreck this unity of the socialist state, anyone who aspires to detach parts and nationalities, is an enemy, a sworn enemy of the state, of the peoples of the USSR. We will annihilate every such enemy, even if he is an old Bolshevik, we will annihilate his entire clan, his family. We will mercilessly annihilate anyone who in actions or thoughts — yes, even in thoughts — who attempts [to undermine] the unity of the socialist state. [Let us drink to] the annihilation of all enemies to the very end, of [the enemies] themselves, and of their families!

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13 The classic Stalin-era works tracing the role of foreign espionage in early Soviet history are Andrei Ia. Vyshinskii, Podryumaia rabota razvedok kapitalisticheskikh stran i ikh Trotskytskogo-bukharinskoi agentury (Moscow 1938); and V. Minaev, Podryumaia rabota inostranynkh razvedok v SSSR (Chast’ pervaya) (Moscow 1940). Obviously, these works are more useful as guides to ‘official ideology’ under Stalinism in 1938–40 than as reliable sources on actual events.
14 As quoted in P.A. Bezymsennii, Operatsiia ‘MIF’, ili Skol’ko raz khoronili Gitlera (Moscow 1995), 49.
In his massive study of Soviet policing in the 1930s, Russian Federal Security Service historian Vladimir Khaustov provided us with the first aggregate data demonstrating the growing foreign separatist component in Stalinist conceptions of ‘enemies’. Taking the two base years of 1937 and 1938 — the height of the Stalin terror — arrests for espionage in the Soviet Union skyrocketed from 10.02 percent (93,890 of 936,750 arrests) in 1937 to 26.8 percent (171,149 of 638,519) in 1938.\(^\text{15}\) (See Table 1.) Evidently, by the end of the 1930s the Soviet fear of internal enemies had become permanently fused with rampant Soviet xenophobia, generating an image of the enemy within as ‘enemy nations’, ethnically defined diaspora nationalities.\(^\text{16}\)

### TABLE 1

Details on 1,575,259 persons arrested by the NKVD in 1937–8

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1937</th>
<th>1938</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Arrested</td>
<td>936,750</td>
<td>638,509</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. By Type of Crime</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C[ounter]-R[evolutionary] Organizations and Political Parties</td>
<td>78,450</td>
<td>64,320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trotskyites</td>
<td>41,362</td>
<td>20,377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right</td>
<td>15,122</td>
<td>17,546</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social[evolutionaries]</td>
<td>11,367</td>
<td>16,370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mensheviks</td>
<td>5,244</td>
<td>4,072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anarchists</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others (Cadets, Monarch. TKP, Detsisty, Shliapnikovtsy &amp; Miasnikovtsy)</td>
<td>5,030</td>
<td>5,393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members of Nationalist C[ounter]-R[evolutionary] Organizations</td>
<td>53,261</td>
<td>68,162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>14,166</td>
<td>27,663</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belorussians</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgians</td>
<td>494</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenians</td>
<td>4,601</td>
<td>2,265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turko-Tatars</td>
<td>2,015</td>
<td>1,753</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pan-Islamic and Pan-Muslim</td>
<td>13,698</td>
<td>10,742</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finno-Karelian</td>
<td>545</td>
<td>1,463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zionist</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>1,926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>17,147</td>
<td>22,243</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


By mid-1938, a pathological distrust of foreigners and their accomplices and a mad search for potential spies had poisoned the atmosphere of everyday life in the Soviet Union. Examples abound. For instance, a woman factory worker dismayed at the culture of xenophobic hate that had emerged in Moscow wrote in a complaint to a Soviet official in May 1938:

I am working at a factory, I am a Stakhanovite, and I sympathize with the [Communist] party . . . [A] week ago my son comes from school and says that all boys are preparing a pogrom and will beat up all the other nations, the Poles, Latvians, Germans, because all their parents are spies. When I tried to find out who said this, he says that one boy’s brother is a Komsomol member and works in the NKVD, and said that soon all the foreign spies who lived in Moscow would be put on trial, and their families [in their apartments] and children at school would be beaten up as Yids were under the tsar . . . Today again, I saw a group of women at our factory discussing the sign ‘Kill the Latvians, the Poles’ [that appeared] on the wall in the morning.\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{17} Excerpt from letter of woman factory worker M. Simenova to Comintern Chief G. Dmitrov, 13 May 1938, published in Chase, \textit{Enemy Within the Gates?} op. cit., 302–4.
Nearly three-quarters (71.7 percent) of all espionage arrests in the Soviet Union in the period 1935–40 alleged collaboration of the accused with just three foreign states: as spies for Poland (105,456, or 37.3 percent of all arrests for espionage), Japan (55,910, or 19.8 percent of all arrests for espionage) and Germany (41,368, or 14.6 percent of all arrests for espionage) (see Table 2).

### TABLE 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Total Arrested</th>
<th>Poland Number</th>
<th>Poland Proportion</th>
<th>Germany Number</th>
<th>Germany Proportion</th>
<th>Japan Number</th>
<th>Japan Proportion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1935–1936</td>
<td>9,965</td>
<td>3,528</td>
<td>35.4%</td>
<td>1,322</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
<td>2,263</td>
<td>22.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937–1938</td>
<td>265,039</td>
<td>99,665</td>
<td>37.6%</td>
<td>39,300</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
<td>52,906</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939–1940</td>
<td>7,620</td>
<td>2,263</td>
<td>29.7%</td>
<td>746</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td>741</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935–1940</td>
<td>282,624</td>
<td>105,456</td>
<td>37.3%</td>
<td>41,368</td>
<td>14.6%</td>
<td>55,910</td>
<td>19.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


By 1939, diaspora ‘enemies’ concentrated in Soviet borderland regions emerged as an ‘especially dangerous element’ (*osobo opasnyi element*) that threatened Soviet internal security. The Soviet invasion of Poland in western Belorussia, western Ukraine and the Baltics, for instance, was legitimized as a ‘war of liberation from the Polish *pans*’, a war in which the Polish upper class became inextricably fused with Polish ethnicity.¹⁸ Class war had been transformed into ethnic war.

In the context of an increasingly tense geopolitical situation brought on by the rise of fascism and Stalin’s growing sense of isolation, the internationalization of *vragi naroda* would profoundly affect Soviet policing. By 1940, the Soviets had grown increasingly concerned by reports of foreign espionage, and especially of the Japanese open recruitment of ethnic nationals as potential fifth columnists in any future war between Japan and the Soviet Union. The focus of Japanese covert operations was believed to be in the borderland regions in the Soviet Far East and periphery zones on the Soviet southern tier, in Central Asia and the Caucasus. According to the testimonies of several captured Japanese agents, specially trained

[s]abotage groups were to commence their activity with the launch by Japan of military operations against the Soviet Union. [They were] to operate in the rear of the Red Army with objectives of destroying telephone and telegraph lines, bridges, storehouses, transport routes,

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with the assassination of Soviet-Party administrative personnel, as well as with robberies, acts of arson and other activities directed at the weakening of the [Soviet] rear.19

While much of the Stalinist hype against foreign spies has been dismissed as nothing more than the subject of Stalinist paranoia or, more cynically, Stalinist political manipulation, documents from US, British and post-Soviet security files have recently confirmed that the Soviets did indeed face a mounting threat of foreign espionage and subversion in the decade preceding the Barbarossa invasion. Soviet xenophobia found a ready justification in rampant foreign intrigues, covert plots to bring Soviet power crashing to the ground.

Germany and Japan: Axis Intelligence and Sabotage Networks, 1935–41

Over the past two decades, historians of Japan have conducted meticulous research documenting the Japanese covert war targeting the Soviet Union. This research was recently supplemented by the CIA’s release of documents summarizing the 1946 interrogations of key Japanese intelligence personnel at Sugamo prison in Tokyo.20 The linchpin in Japanese covert penetrations into the Soviet Union was General Hiroshi Ōshima, Japanese military attaché in Berlin 1934–7, then ambassador in 1938–9 and 1941–5. Largely under Ōshima’s initiatives beginning in 1935, a close Japanese and German cooperation on intelligence rapidly developed, an arrangement formalized in written agreements in 1937 and 1938.21 Key in the German–Japanese relationship was

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20 NARA, RG263 Records of the Central Intelligence Agency: Records Released under the Nazi and Japanese War Crimes Disclosure Acts, CIA Subject Files, 1934–2002 NND36821, Entry A1–87, Box 4, ‘Japanese in Europe (World War II)’, Folders 1 (111 pages) and 2 (111 pages). [Hereafter, cited as ‘Japanese in Europe’.] The Chief of Japanese espionage operations in Europe, General Makato Onodera, was interrogated several times by American military intelligence personnel from 6 May to 20 July 1946. Several others — including General Onouchi (Helsinki) and Colonel Hirose — were interrogated from 3 June to 20 July 1946. The key document is in Folder 2, 41–111: Strategic Services Unit, War Department, ‘Japanese Wartime Intelligence Activities and Northern Europe, 1940–1945, with earlier background,’ dated 30 September 1946.

21 On Japanese–German intelligence sharing, coordinated between Ōshima and German Abwehr chief Admiral Canaris, see Julius Mader, Hitlers Spionagegenerale sagen aus (Berlin 1970), Ch. 6.

Even as there is strong evidence of close intelligence cooperation between the Germans and the Japanese, there remains the unanswered question of why the Germans, who were aware of the compromise of Japanese signals intelligence, failed to inform their allies about this catastrophic security breach. Under codename MAGIC, the US military was regularly reading Japanese naval and military encrypted traffic from the end of 1940. See J.W.M. Chapman, ‘Japanese Intelligence, 1918–1945: A Suitable Case for Treatment’, in Christopher Andrew and Jeremy Noakes (eds), Intelligence and International Relations, 1900–1945 (Exeter 1987), 150–2; on MAGIC, see Carl Boyd, Hitler’s Japanese Confidant: General Oshima Hiroshi and Magic Intelligence, 1941–1945 (Lawrence, KS 2002).
the sharing of Soviet signals intelligence. Following Hitler’s efforts to reach a rapprochement with Stalin (from early 1939), human intelligence targeting the Soviets shifted largely to the domain of the Japanese. Here, Ōshima and his associates relied heavily on four major components: interwar Polish intelligence; interwar Estonian intelligence; interwar Finnish intelligence; and popular disaffection in the non-Russian zones on the periphery of the Soviet Union. These assets were supplemented by special relationships with police agencies in Hungary and Turkey.

Japanese efforts to develop close relationships with leaders of opposition groups among the Soviet Union’s non-Russian minorities began during the tsarist era, following the Russo-Japanese War in 1904–5. These collaborations were always grounded in what participants in the operations repeatedly referred to as ‘a common hatred of Russia’. The most famous example of Japanese–Polish intelligence sharing occurred in 1918, when the Japanese had passed on vital Soviet cryptographic intelligence to the Poles, facilitating the ‘miracle of the Vistula’ by enabling the Polish military to avoid a Soviet encirclement of Warsaw. In the interwar period, the Japanese and Poles likewise shared debriefing facilities and personnel to interrogate thousands of refugees and defectors who illegally crossed the Soviet–Polish border in the west (at the Polish facility at Bialystok), and across the Korean and Manchurian frontiers in the Far East. The Soviet purges had produced hundreds of would-be defectors. Among the most important of these was the 1938 defection of NKVD General G.S. Liushkov, who defected to the Japanese but was subsequently debriefed by Polish officers in summer 1938 for his extensive knowledge about developments in interwar Ukraine.

Throughout the interwar period, the Japanese enjoyed a close relationship with Polish signals intelligence, and especially sharing Polish decrypts of Soviet signals. Japanese officers trained in the Polish General Staff crypto-analytical section included General Hyakutake Seikichi and General Okubo Shunjiro in

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the late 1920s; Colonel Saxai and Colonel Kudo in the early 1930s; Colonel Sakurai Nobuta and Colonel Fukai Eiichi in 1935–6. Likewise, the Japanese system of press and document analysis was acquired from the Poles, even taught by a Polish expert, Colonel Kowaleski, who travelled several times to Japan to teach the method.26

Japanese intelligence operations in the Soviet western borderlands were built by the Japanese military attaché in Riga, Onodera Makato, and Japanese military attaché in Helsinki, Onouchi Hiroshi. A major in Japanese intelligence, Onodera and his wife were stationed in Riga from 1936 to 1938 in order to collect intelligence on the Soviet Union. As an American Strategic Services Unit (SSU) report on Onodera’s networks concluded, ‘Onodera received abundant information from the Latvian and Estonian General Staff Intelligence Services [in the 1930s]. He considers this to have been a most successful assignment. There is no doubt that it was during these years that he made basic contact with some of his most important war-time sources’.27 Onodera’s main contacts in Latvia were the chief of the Latvian military intelligence service, Colonel Kikkus, and the head of the Russian Department in the Latvian General Staff, Colonel Peterson. The resourceful Onodera also established close contacts with Estonian intelligence through the Estonian military attaché in Riga, Colonel Saarsen, and with Polish intelligence through Poland’s military attaché, Major Felix Brzeskwinski.

By 1937, these informal contacts had grown into active joint espionage networks. Estonian military intelligence under Colonel Richard Maasing was then running several of its own agent networks in the Soviet Union, and agreed to share intelligence with the Japanese in return for modest financial support. Onodera passed on his network to an associate in 1938, when he was sent to China to set up similar covert agent networks on the Soviet–Manchurian border.

In October 1940, Onodera was sent back to northern Europe — this time as military attaché in Stockholm, where he picked up where he had left off two years before. By 1940, many of Onodera’s former associates in Polish and Baltic intelligence had been transformed into refugees in search of support for a common war against the Soviet enemy. Among these was the former chief of Estonian military intelligence, Colonel Maasing, who served as Onodera’s X-2 during the war. Onodera also managed to recruit the support of the head of Sweden’s military intelligence, Colonel Adlercreutz, and the Swedish military attaché in Moscow, Colonel Gyllendalfeld.28 As the SSU report concluded:

The Japanese Army General Staff has for many years collaborated closely with the General Staffs of the Polish, Finnish, Estonian, and Latvian Armies in subversive and intelligence activities against Russia . . . This collaboration included the exchange by official agreement

of General Staff officers for training and instruction, the exchange of crypto-analytical and other intelligence material, joint financing and planning of subversive operations in peace as well as in war, and joint training and direction of espionage and sabotage agents.  

The report makes it clear that Japanese military intelligence under Onodera played a pivotal role in interwar subversive activity and intelligence targeting the Soviets, “including direct contact with espionage and sabotage agents, maintenance of clandestine W/T [wireless radio] communications, radio interception and illegal commercial operation”. Soon, the Japanese Military Attaché’s Office in Stockholm became “the most important Japanese espionage post in Europe . . . with close to 2,000,000 Yen held at its disposal for intelligence operations”. Recruiting agents from among a large pool of willing nationalist Poles, Finns, Estonians, Lithuanians, Latvians and Ukrainians, the Japanese managed to infiltrate hundreds of Russian-speaking secret agents into the Soviet Union along the porous western, southern and Far Eastern borders. These agents were trained in espionage, subversion and sabotage in special schools financed by the Japanese, and jointly run with Polish, Finnish, Estonian or Latvian partners. 

Through such joint activities, the Japanese infiltrated the Soviet Union with extensive networks of agents. With the Poles, the Japanese ran active networks in Bialystok, Minsk, Smolensk and Manchuria; with the Estonians, agent networks in Moscow and Khabarovsk; with the Latvians, networks in Ostrov, Pskov and northwest Russia.

Onodera enjoyed similar success in Finland. As J.W.M. Chapman wrote,

> Until the Soviet-Finnish peace in the autumn of 1944, Onodera had been heavily involved in collaborating with the Finnish General Staff in the penetration of the USSR by agents. The Japanese mission was forced out of Finland, but Onodera pulled off a remarkable coup by obtaining several million yen from Tokyo to induce the whole of the deception section of the Finnish General Staff to move to Sweden to continue its work, which was generally regarded as highly effective in reading Soviet coded signals . . . In 1942, the Japanese Army provided secure bases for Abwehr-funded sabotage operations against Siberia and there was collaboration between Colonel Lahousen (Abwehr II) and Colonel Yamamoto Bin over the infiltration of agents into the Caucasus.

The key figure in the Japanese–Finnish cooperation was Nishimura Toshio, Onodera’s predecessor in Stockholm, who recognized that

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29 ‘Japanese in Europe’, Folder 2: 42.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
perhaps the most important cause of the Finnish successes against the Soviet armies had been the crypto-analytical service under Col. Halamaa. It had succeeded in breaking the codes used in Soviet combat communications so rapidly that it could communicate Soviet orders to Finnish unit commanders before they reached their destination in the Soviet lines. Nishimura determined to acquire this valuable weapon for the Japanese services. He consulted with Halamaa and worked out an arrangement whereby a specially designated Japanese officer would be assigned to the Finnish crypto-analytical section for the purpose of learning their methods. The Japanese paid for this privilege with money of which the Finns were sorely in need as a result of the war, and with Russian cipher material — five digit — obtained in the Far East and forwarded by Tokyo.

If Finnish cryptographic research had played a paramount role in Finnish successes during the vaunted Winter War of 1940, then Japan and her allies intended to adapt the Finnish experience to their own war plans.

From autumn 1939, Hitler sought to avoid appearing to betray the Soviet–German alliance, so that Axis espionage operations against the Soviet Union shifted to the Japanese. It is absolutely clear from German reports that the Germans were very well-informed about Japanese efforts to recruit assets in the future war against the Soviet Union. In his report on a conversation with Ōshima, dated 31 January 1939, Heinrich Himmler wrote:

Today I visited General Oshima. The conversation ranged over the following subjects
1. The Fuehrer’s speech, which pleased him very much, especially because it had been spiritually warranted in all its features.
2. We discussed the conclusion of a treaty to consolidate the triangle Germany–Italy–Japan into an even firmer mould. He also told me that, together with German counter-espionage (Abwehr), he was undertaking long-range projects aimed at the disintegration of Russia, and emanating from the Caucasus and the Ukraine. However, this organisation was to become effective only in case of war.
3. Furthermore, he had succeeded up to now in sending ten Russians with bombs across the Caucasian frontier. Their mission was to kill Stalin. A number of additional Russians, whom he had also sent across, had been shot at the frontier.

One of the Japanese agents, an ethnic Ukrainian, was apprehended by the Ukrainian NKVD in 1937, allegedly on his way to Moscow to set up Stalin’s assassination.

For both the Japanese and the Germans, interwar espionage rings targeting the Soviet Union were linked closely with the Promethean League, a pre-war

liberationist movement among non-Russian peoples oppressed by what they referred to as ‘Russian-Jewish Bolshevism’. Founded in Warsaw in 1926 as a clearing house to unite disaffected émigrés passionately driven by the desire to liberate their homelands from Soviet domination, the Promethean League emerged as the most influential such organization of the 1930s. The linchpin in Warsaw was Roman Smal-Stocki — who went on to play an active role in the Captive Nations project and ABN (Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations) after the war.37

Mohammed Ayaz Ishaki (1878–1954), a co-founder of the Promethean League, was a Muslim radical and Crimean Tatar who dreamed of a unified Tatar state extending from Kazan to Samarkand. Eager to utilize foreign enemies of the Soviet Union for his own purposes, Ishaki was covertly dispatched by the Promethean League to Manchuria in the late 1930s to recruit assets for anti-Soviet resistance in Asia.38 By this time, the Promethean League was financed by the Abwehr, and many of its agents had been trained in Germany.39

Michael Kedia was a Georgian leader who spearheaded the Promethean League’s independence movement in the Caucasus. During the second world war, Kedia organized the Tamara unit from Georgian expatriates in France, who infiltrated Soviet-occupied Georgia to prepare for German attack in 1941; later he headed the Georgian desk in the German RSHA (Reichssicherheitshauptamt), Amt VI, in charge of recruiting nationalists from the Caucasus for covert operations to infiltrate and disorganize Soviet operations. As head of the Kaukasische Verbindungstaub during the second world war, Kedia coordinated most of the German parachutist operations into the Caucasus zones under Operation Zeppelin. As an unnamed US intelligence officer wrote in 1945, in his sabotage and subversive operations in the USSR, Kedia ‘enjoyed the complete confidence of the Germans and was allowed to direct all the political penetration work. He also directed operations out of Turkey’.40


38 Dorril, *MI6*, op. cit., 196.

39 See the extended summary report based on debriefings of German intelligence personnel by US Military Intelligence after the war. NARA, RG 319 Records of the Army Staff, IRR File ZA 022138, ‘German Intelligence Activities in the Near East and Related Areas’, *Study of German Intelligence Activities in the Near East and Related Areas Prior to and During World War II*. For a review of pre-war German intelligence on the Soviet Union, see David Kahn, *Hitler’s Spies: German Military Intelligence in World War II* (London 1978).

Another key figure in the Promethean League was Germany’s leading expert on the Caucasus, Gerhard von Mende, who during the war became a high-ranking figure in the Berlin-SD’s covert operations in the Caucasus. Von Mende was the author of a comprehensive history of the national struggle of the Turks of Russia. According to his post-war CIA file, von Mende ‘was [Alfred] Rosenberg’s specialist on all Turkish tribes in Russia and has a mass of information on German fifth column work in the Caucasus and Krimea’. After the war, von Mende became a prominent public figure in West Germany, and worked in the Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung and the Bundesvertriebenenministerium.

While it is difficult to determine the scale of Japanese–German efforts to recruit fifth columnists from among non-Russian minorities in the Soviet borderlands, one fact is clear: Soviet intelligence was absolutely convinced of a growing threat to Soviet internal security linked directly to these actions. In 1940, Soviet intelligence learned of a Japanese plan to utilize various Islamic ‘bandit’ groups in Central Asia, Chechnya and the Caucasus as fifth columnists to strike at the Soviet rear while Japan attacked in the Far East and Germany pushed from the west. Soviet intelligence reported an escalation of the formation of armed units of 100–200 soldiers each from among disaffected national groups (Nanaitsi, Orochi, Ultchi) in the Far Eastern borderland regions of the Soviet Union in 1940–1. Similar reports came from Central Asia regarding Basmachi and Tadzhik nationalists armed and trained by the Japanese and the Germans. These were allegedly supported by armed units in Afghanistan of up to 70,000 guerrillas. In July 1941, Basmachi guerrilla...
leader Abdurashid Bai negotiated the formation of a guerrilla army against the Soviet Union with the support of the prime minister of Afghanistan, Khashmikhhanu. At the same time, Turkmen guerrilla leader Ishan Khalif reached an agreement with the Germans to recruit and train parachutists for dropping saboteurs behind Soviet lines in Central Asia. On the eve of the 22 June 1941 German invasion of the Soviet Union, NKVD analysts had determined that the Germans had some 4000 agents working to recruit anti-Soviet assets in Iran.

In retrospect, it is fairly well established that the Soviets had effectively penetrated many of these Japanese covert operations. The Soviets were systematically opening Japanese diplomatic pouches routed from Europe through Moscow to the Far East until 1936. This operation revealed to the Soviets the secret German–Japanese agreements to collaborate against the Soviet Union. The raw, decrypted communications also provided the Soviets with important keys to German and Japanese ciphers. Only recently was it discovered, for instance, that the Soviets had broken Japanese diplomatic codes and were systematically reading Ōshima’s communications from Berlin. And recent evidence from Federal Security Service (FSB) archives has shown that the notorious Soviet double agent, the White General Anton Turkul, had penetrated the Japanese networks through Ōshima by early 1937. It is likely that Turkul used his networks of agents in the White émigré community to recruit and send penetration agents into the Soviet Union. It has been confirmed that Turkul

46 GARF, f. R-9478, op. 1, d. 147, l. 2; and the classified report, R. Kh. Arzumanov, Lektsiia ob organizatsii agenturnoi operativnoi raboty organov NKVD po bor’be s basmachesko-povsanicheskim elementom i formirovaniami na territorii Tadzhiskoi SSR (Stalinabad n.d. [probably 1944]). GARF, R-9478, op. 1, d. 147, ll. 76–99.
47 Ibid., ll. 59–60 ob.
49 Chapman, ‘Japanese Intelligence, 1918–1945’, op. cit., 150; K.E. Cherevkio, Serp i molot protiv samuraiskogo mecha (Moscow 2003); Vasilii Molodiakov, Bitvy imperii. Rossia i Iaponia: mech na vesakh (Moscow 2005); Coox, Nomonhan, op. cit.
50 This included advance notice of Japan’s intention to attack the United States fleet at Pearl Harbor, communicated in a coded message from Ōshima to Tokyo confirming that he had informed the Germans of the planned attack. The Soviets deciphered the telegram on 20 November 1941, 11 days before US intelligence deciphered (and subsequently ignored) the same telegram. See ‘Soviet Union Deciphered Japan’s Coded Telegram on War with the US’, The Japan Times, 10 August 2004. I am grateful to Hiroaki Kuromiya for bringing this item to my attention.
provided these services to the Germans in the so-called ‘MAX’ networks throughout the Soviet–German war.52

The Southern Tier

Nowhere did the Soviets find a greater threat to their vital national security interests than in the Caucasus, particularly in Chechnya in the northern Caucasus. Situated in a borderland region with harsh terrain that facilitated tactical manoeuvring, the Northern Caucasus was by 1940 home to nearly half a million Chechen and Ingush people — linked by long and proud traditions of resistance to Russian authority; linked also by cultural, kinship, religious, and linguistic ties that extended throughout the zones of the former Ottoman Empire from Central Asia through the Middle East into south-eastern Europe. Located at a strategic crossroads of Caspian, Azerbaijani and Georgian oil and gas reserves, the Northern Caucasus was a vital Soviet strategic zone held together by Soviet military control of a vulnerable network of bridges, roads and mountain passes. The narrow, mountainous isthmus that separated northern Iran from southern European Russia provided 93.5 percent of all Soviet oil and fuel reserves, concentrated at three key points: 58.5 percent passed through Baku and Batum in the south and another 27.5 percent passed through Grozny, the capital city of Chechnya, in the Northern Caucasus. Likewise 91 percent of all Soviet fuel was refined at these three sites. There were also strategic oil reserves located in Malgobek, Maikop and Kievske in the Northern Caucasus, with connections to facilities in the Black Sea (to the west) and the Caspian Sea (to the east).53

Despite Chechnya’s strategic importance, the interwar period there was marked by almost continuous armed resistance to Soviet power.54 The harsh

52 After the war, Anton Turkul was recruited by US Intelligence and went on to serve as head of the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations. He died of natural causes in 1959, never having been discovered as a Soviet double agent. In a 1996 interview with the author, Turkul’s CIA controller, Harry Rositzke, refused to accept that Turkul had ever been a Soviet spy. On Turkul, see the record of his rigorous vetting, with interrogation transcripts and a small selection of declassified post-war intelligence on the Soviets in NARA, RG 319, IRR File No. XE001758, NA Declassification No. NND873001, Boxes 234B-234C. See also John Loftus and Mark Aarons, Unholy Trinity: The Vatican, Nazis, and Soviet Intelligence (New York 1992).


terrain facilitated fast strikes and easy escape from Soviet military or police action.

From its very inception the people of the Chechen republic defied traditional Soviet templates based on class and revolutionary consciousness. The Soviet war in Chechnya shattered class-based paradigms to explain anti-Soviet resistance. Whereas in western Ukraine, or Belorussia, or the Baltics, the Soviets defined their main enemies as ‘kulak’ [wealthy peasant] opposition, anti-Soviet organizations of ‘bourgeois nationalists’, ethnic separatists in the Northern Caucasus resisted such easy labelling. As the Soviet officer in charge of keeping the peace in Chechnya in the Civil War era reported: ‘Even the glimmer of class consciousness has not been found among the Chechen people’.\(^5\) The situation was no better by 1925: ‘There has never been any sort of class struggle in Chechnya, just banditry’\(^6\). Indeed, it often seemed to Soviet military and party cadres sent to fix the situation that the Soviet struggle in Chechnya was one endless stream of struggle against banditry. As regional military commander S.N. Kozhevnikov reported: ‘In Chechnya, as in Karachai, we have had not separate bandit, counterrevolutionary actions, but actual insurrections of whole raions . . . in which almost the entire population took part in armed actions’\(^7\). The intractable resistance of Chechnya rendered at best a tone of disdainful condescension among Soviet leaders sent to manage the region.

Presented after the Revolution with the very best of rich lands in flat areas, the Chechens refuse to work them, and insist instead on traditional ways of working the land. They are just lazy. As a mass, the Chechens are inclined towards banditism as a principal source of easy profit, which is facilitated by the great number of arms on hand. Mountainous Chechnya is a sanctuary for the most deep-rooted enemies of Soviet power.\(^8\)

Abandoning ideology, Soviet experts came increasingly to see Chechnya as a special case: a ‘bandit nation’ where religious and cultural customs enhanced

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5\(^5\) RGVA, f. 28108, op. 1, d. 65, l. 11; Pykalov, ‘Stranitsy istorii: Severnyi Kavkaz. Prichiny deportatsii 1943–1945 gg’. Obviously, there are serious problems relying on Soviet and Russian sources to reconstruct any aspects of Chechen history. Russian depictions of the Chechen question are without exception heavily laden with a deep-seated antagonism towards the Chechens. The obstacles and pitfalls are discussed in detail in Ehren Park and David Brandenberger, ‘Imagined Community? Rethinking the Nationalist Origins of the Contemporary Chechen Crisis’, *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 5(3) (Summer 2004), 543–60. This elusive pursuit is further hampered by the fact that various Russian–Chechen or Soviet–Chechen wars over the past 200 years have virtually annihilated Chechen archives, libraries, and other resources, making it impossible to write a history of Chechnya without relying heavily on Russian sources. On the Russian/Soviet destruction of Chechen institutional memory, see D. Saidumov, ‘V tsentre vni-manii uchenyh — Chechnia’, *Stolitsa plus* 41 (25 May 2003).


5\(^7\) RGVA, f. 25896, op. 9, d. 350, l. 31; Pykalov, ‘Stranitsy istorii: Severnyi Kavkaz. Prichiny deportatsii 1943–1945 gg’.

5\(^8\) 5 September 1925. RGVA, f. 25896, op. 9, d. 287, ll. 84ob-85; Igor’ Pykalov, ‘Kak vyslali Chechentsev’, *Molodaia gvardiia* 1 (28 February 2003), 136–49.
the likelihood of fifth columnist activity, and escalated the serious threat to Soviet national interests in this strategically vital region.


Ironically, the first serious threat to Soviet interests in the Caucasus would come not from Germany or Japan, but from the Soviet Union’s future wartime allies. The rapprochement between Germany and the Soviet Union signified by the Non-Aggression Treaty signed on 23 August 1939 fundamentally altered the geopolitical landscape of the Caucasus region. This was especially true after the start of the second world war, with the German invasion of Poland a week later, on 1 September 1939. Although the Molotov–Ribbentrop pact did not officially make the Soviet Union an enemy of the French and the British, reliable reports regarding secret protocols in which Hitler and Stalin had divided Eastern Europe along the Curzon Line effectively betrayed Stalin’s ruse, and raised expectations that the Soviets would eventually join the war on the side of Germany. At the very least, the Soviet Union could be expected to undermine the British–French plan to blockade Germany’s access to strategic materials.

With the largest standing army in Europe, the French were expected to contain Hitler’s hunger for European expansion towards the west. For the French, the Caucasus therefore took on a special meaning: if the French did not bring war to the Germans in another theatre, the Germans would inevitably bring war to French borders.59

French and British war plans in 1939 and 1940 unequivocally centred on their hopes in the Caucasus. French–British planners estimated that a small force of just two Blenheim squadrons, flying two sorties a week, could demolish all three primary targets in just 5–12 weeks. Since actual Anglo-French air strength in the region far exceeded these minimal estimates, it was expected that Anglo-French squadrons could demolish their targets in just one to three weeks.60 The logic of this limited air war was simple: by concentrating on a

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60 Millman, ‘Toward War with Russia’, op. cit., 273. The War Plans depended on access to the best airfields for the each attack: to strike Baku, Anglo-French plans needed bases at Tehran, Tabriz (Iran) and Kars (Turkey); to strike Grozny, they needed bases at Kars, Erzurum (Turkey) and Tabriz; against Batum, they needed bases at Kars, Erzurum, and Erzincan (Turkey). therein
‘few high-value targets’, the western allies sought ‘the complete collapse of war potential of the USSR’, effectively putting the Soviet military out of the picture altogether. Although Soviet oil accounted for a mere 4 percent of all German oil consumption in 1940, French and British planners believed that strategic air strikes in the Caucasus would destroy any chance that the Soviets could join the German side, and moreover the attacks would render Soviet energy resources unavailable for exploitation by the Germans for months or even years.

In addition to direct military action, the British and French intended to threaten long-term Soviet prospects in the Caucasus by providing support for separatist movements among the region’s non-Russian indigenous populations. Like the Germans and the Japanese, the British and French sought to exploit the passions and skills of anti-Soviet émigré groups to detonate insurgencies throughout the Caucasus. The British established active contact with Kurdish and Armenian separatists in the Caucasus in spring 1940. Curiously, to coordinate these separatist operations, the French and the British relied upon the same core group of disaffected anti-Soviet émigrés as had the Japanese and the Germans: émigré groups from among the Soviet Union’s national minorities united for the liberation of their homelands from Soviet tyranny. With so many competing nations recruiting from the same base, intrigues and plots abounded. And so too did the ease with which Soviet intelligence penetrated these various foreign plots.

The microhistory of bitterly anti-Soviet émigré relations with European states in the covert war against the Soviets can be traced through the reports of Soviet ‘Agent 59’ — a close assistant to ousted Georgian President Noe Jordania in the foreign operations section of the Georgian Mensheviks (based in Paris), and a leading member of both the ‘Caucasus’ group and the Promethean League.

A top secret report of NKVD Chief Lavrentii P. Beriia to Joseph Stalin, dated 4 November 1940, summarized Soviet intelligence on Turkey’s agreement to sponsor operations against the Soviets. Soviet agent ‘Omeri’ — a pro-Soviet recruit from the Caucasus — was the Soviet handler for ‘Agent 59’ — an active member of the Georgian Menshevik party since 1918. (‘Agent 59’ had been arrested by the Georgian Cheka in 1922, and was incarcerated at that time for more than a year.) Released as a spy for the Soviets, ‘Agent 59’ attended the Georgian Menshevik founding convention in 1924 and soon after emigrated to

lay a major obstacle: while the Iranians had agreed to support war against Russia in February 1940, the Turks prevaricated — refusing either to lend air bases or to admit British warships into the Black Sea for war against the Soviet Union. The successful German invasion of France in May 1940 ended any serious Anglo-French considerations to bomb Soviet oil facilities from the south.

61 Quotation from the original British War Plans report, quoted in ibid., 273.
62 Ibid., 279.
France. In 1930, ‘Agent 59’ joined the Georgian Menshevik foreign bureau; in 1939, he became a member of the Georgian National Union.

In September 1939, under direct orders from Noe Jordania, ‘Agent 59’ conducted negotiations with representatives of France (General Beriko and Colonel Loshar), England (Colonel Scott and Captain Williams) and Poland (Colonel Novacheck) regarding Anglo-French covert anti-Soviet operations. Soon after the meeting, ‘Agent 59’ was dispatched to Syria, then to Beirut, where he served as expert on Caucasian affairs advising French General Maxime Weygand. Weygand introduced ‘Agent 59’ to the French military attaché in Turkey, Gergo, and to his assistant in Istanbul, General Lele; under Weygand’s orders, in October 1939 Gergo introduced ‘Agent 59’ to Turkish Chief of Staff Marshall Fevzi Çakmak. It was through Çakmak that ‘Agent 59’ would become acquainted with Nuri Pasha, a leading Turkish manufacturer of nitrogen-based explosives well known for his contacts in Turkish ruling circles. ‘Agent 59’s’ close friendship with Nuri Pasha would ensure that he remained at the centre of Turkish operations in the Caucasus throughout the next half-decade. Together, the two would launch several covert schemes.

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64 On Çakmak (1876–1950), see the biography by his grandson, Nilüfer Hatemi, ‘Unfolding a Life: Marshall Fevzi Çakmak’s Diaries’, two vols, PhD dissertation, Princeton University, 2000. Çakmak was the first Chief of the General Staff of the Turkish Republic, from 1923 to 1944.

65 Nuri Pasha (1889–1949) was a Turkish general, commander of the so-called ‘Army of Islam’ (Islam Ordusu) in Azerbaijan, responsible for the slaughter of tens of thousands of Armenians in Baku in 1918. His elder brother was Enver Pasha, former minister of war of the Ottoman Empire, and the main architect of the Armenian genocide. His uncle was Halil Pasha, commander of Ottoman forces in the Caucasus. While awaiting a British military tribunal for war crimes, Nuri Pasha escaped from a British military prison in Batum on 9 August 1919. Thereafter, Nuri Pasha went underground, where by the mid-1920s he adopted his clan name of Nuri Pasha Killigil. In a secret report from 1940, Soviet intelligence labelled Nuri Pasha of ‘pro-German orientation’, a leader of the pan-Turkist movement with close relations with leaders of pro-Turkish separatist groups in the Caucasus. His brother-in-law was Kazim Orbay, the third Chief of the General Staff of the Turkish armed forces. Nuri Pasha used his extensive military and government connections to become a major producer of weapons and munitions in the interwar period, a leading supplier for the Turkish military, and for the Germans in the second world war. According to CIA sources, Nuri Pasha ‘represented a very influential Turanian group — Turkistan’. Nuri Pasha was killed in Istanbul in a munitions factory explosion on 2 March 1949. Jordan’s Prince Damad Muhammad Abdul-Majid Haidar Bey Effendi, a future ambassador to Turkey, wrote in Nuri Pasha’s London obituary: ‘The most encouraging feature of recent times is that some personalities and groups are emerging to make efforts to bring together the Islamic world and peoples united by a common Muslim civilization . . . Nuri Pasha Killigil was one of the most prominent champions for this cause’. The Islamic Review 37 (June 1949): 41–2.

Nuri Pasha had met personally with Adolf Hitler and German ambassador Franz von Papen in Berlin in December 1941, after which Hitler authorized the OKW to create two Muslim divisions: the Turkestanische Legion, consisting of Muslim volunteers from Central Asia (Turkmen, Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Karakalpaks and Tadzhiks); and the Kaukasisch-Mohamedanische Legion, composed of Muslim volunteers from the Caucasus (Azeris, Daghestanis, Chechens, Ingushetians and Lezghins). Three more Muslim volunteer units were created in 1942: Muslim Tatars in the Wolgatatartische Legion, formed in Poland in January 1942; and the Aserbaidschanische Legion and the Armenische Legion, both formed in April 1942. For details, see O.V. Roman’ko, Musul’manskie legiony vo Vtoroi mirovoi voine (Moscow 2004).
to infiltrate liberationist forces into the Caucasus, including the recruitment of German parachutists, as well as the construction of several Caucasus armed legions from among German POWs.

In less than six months, Beria boasted, the Soviets had managed to place one of their most reliable agents — moreover, a veteran of the old Mingrelian group that united Beria and Stalin — into the very centre of Anglo-French operations in the Caucasus. Overwhelming evidence suggests that Soviet ‘Agent 59’ was none other than Michael Kedia. Kedia would remain active as Soviet ‘Agent 59’ throughout the entire period from 1939 to 1945, providing Moscow Centre with detailed information on Turkey’s relationships with the English and French in 1939–40, then with Germany and Japan between 1941 and 1944.

Documents attached to Beriia’s November 1940 memorandum to Stalin likewise confirm that the Soviets were very well informed about French and British war plans in the Caucasus: Soviet declassified files include verbatim texts of high-level documents within the French and British General Staff, as well as internal communications and memoranda between key French and British officers.

Although the Iranians agreed to a joint war with the British against the Soviet Union in February 1940, the Turks resisted Anglo-French pressures for a joint war against the Soviets, and the successful German blitzkrieg against France in May 1940 interrupted British and French plans to bring war to the Caucasus. But the near miss in 1940 taught the Soviets valuable lessons of just how vulnerable they had become to foreign attack in the south. New

66 The evidence that Kedia was in fact a Soviet spy is overwhelming. Besides the close fit to Beriia’s description of ‘Agent 59’ in the 1940 report to Stalin, there is also a confidential report from FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover to the CIA, dated 10 March 1950: the comprehensive 23-page dossier implicates Michael Kedia, E. Hengelhaupt (Kedia’s counterpart in the German SD), and several associates in the Georgian group as Soviet spies. See CIA-Kedia File, end of Folder 3.

There is also this curious episode from 1944. V.N. Merkulov, head of the NKGB during the war, knew of Kedia’s status as an agent for the Soviets; but his deputy P.M. Fitin, head of the NKGB’s foreign operations, evidently did not. This is reflected in a memorandum to Molotov prepared by Fitin to be sent over Merkulov’s signature, summarizing Kedia’s wartime activities for the Germans. Merkulov quashed the memo, which was never sent, explaining that he did not want to reveal to other departments the identities of Soviet agents in place. The unsent memorandum from Merkulov to Molotov, dated 29 July 1944, was published as Appendix 6 in Lev Sotskov, Neizvestnyi separatizm: Na sluzhbe SD i Abvera (Iz sekretnykh dos’e razvedki) (Moscow 2003), 321–3.

67 Besides his work in the Caucasus, the busy Kedia also found time to run the Caucasus refugee organization in Paris (a German effort to recruit émigrés for clandestine anti-Soviet operations) and an operation to infiltrate the Vatican through a planned Georgian monastery in Rome to be purchased with German-SS money. See the details of the ‘Georgian Cloister’ operation in CIA-Kedia File; and David J. Alvarez and Robert A. Graham, Nothing Sacred: Nazi Espionage Against the Vatican, 1939–1945 (London 1998), 92–113.

68 The texts of the Anglo-French war plans in 1940 apprehended by Soviet espionage were published in V.P. Iampol’skii, ‘Sprovotsirovat’ volneniia sredi musul’manskogo naselenia na Kavkaze’, Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal 6 (1995), 64–70.

69 Millman, ‘Toward War with Russia’, op. cit., 274.
technology brought new vulnerabilities, and would force a profound re-
orientation of Soviet national defence policy, one where the main Soviet stra-
getic zone would move from the Far East to the Caucasus and the Near East in
the early post-war years.

The Founding of GUBB

The essence of banditry is a most active form of counter-revolutionary activity.
GUBB Lecturer, Lieutenant of State Security Vaisberg

It is widely accepted that Stalin failed to heed advance intelligence on hostile
German and Japanese intentions, and that his regime failed to prepare for war.
Substantial research over the past decades has demonstrated that at least until
spring 1941, Stalin avoided following Zhukov’s recommendations for advance
military preparations, and instead preferred to pursue diplomatic solutions. In
the months leading up to the launch of Operation Barbarossa in June 1941,
Hitler’s plans to invade the Soviet Union were reported by no less (and prob-
ably far more) than 84 confirmed intelligence sources.

But Stalin and his close cohort were so driven by the imperative of avoiding
what Stalin called ‘Churchill’s dirty provocations’ to bring the Soviets into the
war against Hitler that any report on Germany’s aggressive intentions was
interpreted as an act of treason. As historians L. Dvoinykh and N. Tarkhova
discovered,

[...] Just six days before the German invasion — Soviet secret agents in Berlin sent a report to
Moscow stating that Germany’s armed forces were completely prepared for an armed offen-
sive against the USSR, and that an attack could be expected at any moment. On the report,
Stalin wrote in his own hand: ‘You can tell your “source” in the headquarters of the German
air force to go f-k his mother. He’s not a source, he’s a disinformation agent.’ . . . [Stalin’s
deputy] Lavrentii Beria wrote the following order on a dispatch, warning that Germany was
going to attack: ‘In the recent past, many personnel have succumbed to blatant provocations
and are sowing panic. For passing on systematic disinformation, these secret personnel . . .
need to be pulverized into prison-camp dust as abettors of international provocateurs who
hope to lure us into a quarrel with Germany.’

70 Commentary notes on a lecture by Lt Vaisberg, 11 February 1945. GARF, f. R-9478, op. 1,
d. 147, l. 45.
71 Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, KGB: The Inside Story of Its Foreign Operations
from Lenin to Gorbachev (New York 1990), 260; Gabriel Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion: Stalin
and the German Invasion of Russia (New Haven, CT 1999).
72 L. Dvoinykh and N. Tarkhova, ‘What Military Intelligence Reported: Historians Have a
Chance to Analyze Soviet Dispatches on the Eve of the War’, in Bruce W. Menning (ed.), At the
Threshold of War: The Soviet High Command in 1941, in Russian Studies in History: A Journal
of Translations (Winter 1997–8), 76–93. On the atmosphere of suspicion surrounding Soviet
agents in the 1930s and 1940s, see Genrik Borovik, The Philby Files: The Secret Life of Master Spy
Kim Philby (Boston, MA 1994).
I would argue that Stalin did not in fact ignore intelligence on hostile preparations for war, but instead responded in a quintessentially Stalinist way: from autumn 1940 Stalin escalated the drive against suspected fifth columnists inside the Soviet Union who might disrupt the Soviet rear in the event of the outbreak of war. The institutional linchpin of this effort to defend the homeland from potential fifth columnists was the Main Directorate for the Struggle Against Banditry (GUBB), an elite inter-agency secret police unit established in late 1940 to combat the threat of foreign support for organized domestic insurgent groups and, later, to lead counter-insurgency operations against organized armed opposition throughout the Soviet Union.\footnote{Reflecting Stalinist heightened awareness of organized armed insurgencies on the Soviet periphery in the late 1930s, separate and overlapping departments for the ‘struggle against banditry’ were established in the NKVD and NKGB in 1938. These were consolidated into an inter-agency unit under the aegis of the NKVD’s 2nd Department in autumn 1940. On 1 December 1944, with NKVD decree No. 001447, the ‘struggle against banditry’ was elevated from the level of a department (otdel) to a directorate (upravlenie) of the NKVD. Of 1368 files (dela) in GUBB’s secret inventory (with documents dating from 1938 to 1950), 172 complete files were transferred to the Arkhiv KGB (now, FAO FSB) in the early 1980s, corresponding to the escalation of armed banditry in the North Caucasus and Soviet Central Asia following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. A large proportion of these files deal with the Soviet war in the Caucasus, so that accessible material on the Chechen guerrillas remains scant. See the complete inventory of GARF f. R-9478, op. 1s. As at 2006, less than a quarter of GUBB documents have been declassified for scholarly research, mainly following requests from sister organs in Ukraine and the Baltics. Secret resolution 101–48 SS of the Council of Ministers dated 20 January 1947, and an associated decree (0074/0029) of the Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs dated 21 January 1947, split ‘struggle against banditry’ operations into two parts: the Soviet counter-insurgency apparatus (the struggle against political banditry) was transferred from the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) to the Ministry of State Security (MGB); thereafter, the MVD would be restricted to policing criminal banditry. On the pre-GUBB Soviet ‘struggle against banditry’, see David R. Shearer, ‘Crime and Social Disorder in Stalin’s Russia: A Reassessment of the Great Retreat and the Origins of Mass Repression’, Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique 39(1–2) (January–June 1998), 119–48; Paul M. Hagenloh, ‘“Chekhist in Essence, Chekhist in Spirit”: Regular and Political Police in the 1930s’, Cahiers du monde russe 42(2–4) (2001); David Shearer, ‘Social Disorder, Mass Repression, and the NKVD during the 1930s’, Cahiers du monde russe 42(2–4) (2001); Tracy McDonald, ‘Soviet Bandit Tales: “The Steam of the Still and the Lure of Easy Profit”’, Canadian-American Slavic Studies, 35(2–3) (Summer–Fall 2001), 219–43.}

The ‘struggle against banditry’ soon became a fundamental part of the curriculum in the NKVD’s Higher School. In 1943, a 40-hour programme on banditry was integrated into the NKVD’s curriculum for all future officers of state security, covering 17 main themes, from ‘The Essence of Banditry’ to special discussions like ‘Banditry Under Conditions of the Patriotic War’, ‘Organizing Informants’ Networks for the Struggle Against Banditry’, how to conduct an interrogation of a suspected bandit, numerous local case studies and ‘Methods in the Struggle Against Banditry’.

The course was both descriptive — analysing the root causes of banditry — and prescriptive — offering numerous tactics for its liquidation. Most attention was based on the presumed intrinsic link between ‘banditry’ and foreign enemies: ‘Banditism inspired by intelligence organs of the enemy’. 
The first course instructor was Lt-Colonel Melamedov, a veteran of covert Soviet operations in the North Caucasus. His lecture notes on the ‘Conditions for Bandit Operations’ outlined what had become the greatest threat to Soviet internal security: organized armed opposition among non-Russian nationalist ‘bandit’ elements on the Soviet periphery. Placed in GUBB’s context of a ‘struggle against banditry’, the Soviet Union’s enemy ‘diaspora nationalities’ of the 1930s were transformed into ‘bandit nations’ characterized by these distinct elements:

1. borderland elements, with close kinship or ethnic ties to foreign-based emigration
2. foreign use of those elements for espionage and other seditious actions within the USSR
3. strong religious traditions
4. sustained by ‘heroic’ historical movement of insurrectionary elements
5. operates on hostile terrain that facilitates concealment.74

The GUBB course emphasized the so-called ‘Piedmont Principle’ — a conception of organized armed opposition based on the presumption that the main internal threat to Soviet security lay among the organized armed opposition movements of non-Russian national minorities concentrated on the periphery of Soviet territory and supported by large diaspora populations — either directly or, as in the case of Islamic links, with foreign states.75

Staffed by instructors who were veterans of Soviet covert operations, the Special Tasks School trained agents in the fundamentals of Soviet counter-insurgency tactics, the hallmark of GUBB tactics:

Dezorganizatsiia (Disorganization)

1. diversiia (sabotage)
2. agentura (informants’ networks)
3. verbouka (recruitment)
4. maskirovka (deception)
5. terror: murder; arrest, torture, imprisonment; deportation.

Special textbooks were developed by NKVD scholars who gleaned materials from Russian imperial and Soviet state archives. Standard texts for the course included extraordinary collections of documents on selected case studies: ‘The Uprising in Central Asia, 1916’; ‘Civil War in Bukhara, 1910’; and the ‘History of the Chechen Resistance, 1830–1940’. It is clear from GUBB archives that operations files did themselves become the foundation of the institutional memory of Soviet organs of state security in the 1940s: before their dispatch to the field, GUBB officers familiarized themselves with files per-

74 GARF, f. R-9478, op. 1, d. 147, ll. 1–6.
Chechnya in the Second World War

The struggle taking place between bloody Jewish-Bolshevism and National Socialism of Germany with the support of the peoples of New Europe, has entered a decisive phase. In this struggle of the peoples for their freedom and independence, Muslims who for 26 years have suffered under the yoke of Bolshevism cannot stand at the side . . . Remember what sort of tortures Stalin has brought to the peoples of the Caucasus. It is he who deprived us of our freedom . . . This demands vengeance! The time for retribution has come!

From a German leaflet summoning the Northern Caucasus to join the war against Stalin

Historian Alexander Statiev has persuasively argued that the net effect of Soviet counter-insurgency policies in Soviet borderland regions in the interwar period helped to forge a unified anti-Soviet movement from among these numerous disparate bandit groups. That was certainly the case in the Northern Caucasus, where the rapid decline in Soviet authority was palpable. The Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Republic (ASSR) consisted of 24 raions (regions) and the capital city of Grozny. Roughly two-thirds of raion first secretaries deserted their posts during the first eight months of the war. The NKVD chief in Grozny, Kabulov, reported to Moscow: ‘With the approaching line of the front in August–September 1942, eighty members of the Communist Party abandoned their positions and ran. This included sixteen raion committee chiefs, eight directors of raion executive committees, and fourteen collective farm presidents’. Those who remained were largely Russian, and many of these became the targets of subsequent Chechen-Ingush guerrilla actions.

Who among the Chechen native leadership defected to the Germans? Defectors included a large proportion of the Soviet aktiv in Chechnya-Ingushetia. Among these were Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov, a professor at the Institute of Language and Literature in Grozny, who subsequently organized an

76 On Soviet special tasks training programmes for ‘small wars’ in Soviet periphery areas, see Aleksei Iu. Popov, Diversanty Stalina: Deiatel’nost’ organov Gosbezopasnosti SSSR na okupirovannyi sovetskoi territorii v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny (Moscow 2004), 34–54.
anti-partisan unit; El’sbek Timurkaev, editor of the Soviet newspaper *Leninskii put’* [*Lenin’s Way*], who followed Avtorkhanov to the Germans; First Secretary Tangiev and Second Secretary Sadykov of the regional Party executive committee in Itum-Kale. In Galanchozh raion: Party Third Secretary Kharsiev and Org.-Instructor Vishagurov; Deputy to the Supreme Soviet Sultanov; President Albakov and Vice President Evloev of the regional Executive Committee; regional Komsomol secretary Tsichoev; raion procurator Aushev; and others.80

The cause of the mass defection of Chechen cadres was largely the overwhelming conviction of an inevitable German victory; and, of course, deep-seated hostility to Soviet policies in the Northern Caucasus. But the German–Chechen relationship was problematic from the start, founded almost entirely on their mutual hatred for the Soviet enemy.

The key period of the guerrilla war in Chechnya dated from the approach of the German front in August–September 1942 to the Soviet counter-offensive that drove the Germans out of the Caucasus in summer–autumn 1943. The influence of the German advance can be observed in the rate of failures to appear for military duty conducted in the Chechen-Ingush ASSR between 1941 and 1943. From a population of about 460,000 in 1941, the Soviet General Staff estimated that roughly 80,000 Chechens and Ingush were fit for military duty. Of the 80,000 called up between 1941 and 1944, 70,000 (87.5 percent) failed to serve. Chronologically, the decline of Chechen-Ingush service correlated directly to the advance of the German line into the Caucasus. At the first mobilization in August 1941, 8000 men were called to duty, and 719 failed to show. In October 1941, 4733 were called, 362 failed to appear. By January 1942, as the Soviets endeavoured to create a Northern Caucasus national division, 50 percent of those called to duty failed to appear. In March 1942, among 14,576 called for service, more than 93 percent (13,560) failed to appear or deserted in the walk to Grozny.81

(Many of the locations in or near Chechnya mentioned in this section can be found in Figure 1.)

**Hassan Israilov (aka Terloev)**

Hassan Israilov was perhaps the most influential Chechen guerrilla leader of the Second World War. Born in 1910 in village Nachkha, Galanchozh raion, to a descendant of the renowned rebel leader Shamil, Israilov completed study at a local Islamic school before joining a communist student group in 1919. Graduating from a communist middle school in Rostov in 1929, Israilov


FIGURE 1
Chechnya and the Northern Caucasus

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entered the ranks of the Communist Party at that time. In 1933, he was sent to Moscow’s Communist University of Workers of the East. In 1935, Israilov’s new career was cut short when his signature was found on a student petition opposing the current course of Soviet policy in the Northern Caucasus — and he was sentenced under article 58.10 to five years’ forced labour.\footnote{82} Released in 1939 when his own accusers were arrested, Israilov returned to Chechnya, and took up a position as a barrister in his native Shatoi raion.\footnote{83}

In 1940, Israilov formally and permanently broke with Soviet power, sending a written statement to the Chechen Communist Party leadership:

I have decided to become the leader of a war of liberation of my own people. I understand all too well that not only in Checheno-Ingushetia, but in all nations of the Caucasus it will be difficult to win freedom from the heavy yoke of Red imperialism. But our fervent belief in justice and our faith in the support of the freedom-loving peoples of the Caucasus and of the entire world inspire me toward this deed, in your eyes impertinent and pointless, but in my conviction, the sole correct historical step. The valiant Finns are now proving that the Great Enslaver Empire is powerless against a small but freedom-loving people. In the Caucasus you will find your second Finland, and after us will follow other oppressed peoples.\footnote{84}

By February 1940, Hassan Israilov and his brother Hussein had established a guerrilla base in the mountains of south-eastern Chechnya, where they worked to organize a unified guerrilla movement to prepare an armed insurrection against the Soviets. Operating under the rubric of the ‘Provisional People’s Revolutionary State of Checheno-Ingushetia’, in the summer of 1941 alone they convened 41 different meetings to recruit local supporters, and expanded their base from Galanchozh and Itum-Kale raions to Borzoï, Kharsenoi and Akhinti. They also sent emissaries to negotiate joint operations with other guerrilla groups throughout the Northern Caucasus. By midsummer 1941, they counted over 5000 armed guerrillas and at least 25,000 sym-

\footnote{82} This sympathetic account was provided by Chechen writer Aleksandr Uralov (pseud.) [A. Avtorkhanov], *Ubiistvo Checheno-Ingushskogo naroda: narodoubistvo v SSSR* (Moscow 1991). In the official NKVD version, which is inconsistent, Israilov was born in 1903, arrested four times in the 1920s, but released due to bribes and deceptive alibis provided by his family. Renouncing his criminal past in 1933, Israilov agreed to work for Soviet power — and was sent to Communist University in Moscow at that time. While the Soviet summary accuses Israilov of having organized an underground terror group — ‘Islamic Avengers’ (*Musul’manskie mstiteli*) — there is no evidence to support that claim. See Sergei Chuev, ‘Severnii Kavkaz 1941–1945. Voina v tylu (Bor’ba s bandformirovaniami)’, *Obozrevatel’* 2 (2002). The official Soviet version can be found at GARF, R-9478, op. 1, d. 55, ll. 1–9.

Several Western historians have challenged the reliability of Avtorkhanov’s work. See the summary in Park and Brandenberger, ‘Imagined Community? Rethinking the Nationalist Origins of the Contemporary Chechen Crisis’, 543–60. For other family biographical information, see the GUBB interrogation transcript of Hassan’s brother, Hussein Israilov, dated 10–15 July 1943, published in ‘Dokumenty iz arkhiva Iosifa Stalina’, *Nezavisimaia gazeta* 37 (29 February 2000).

\footnote{83} Avtorkhanov, *Ubiistvo Checheno-Ingushskogo naroda*, op. cit. In the official Soviet version, Israilov escaped from Siberia (allegedly killing a guard and two dogs) and made his way back to Chechnya. GARF. f. R-9478, op. 1, d. 55, ll. 1–9. The sources conflict on whether Israilov returned in 1937 or 1939.

\footnote{84} Quoted in Chuev, ‘Severnii Kavkaz’, op. cit.
pathizers organized into 5 military districts encompassing the large Chechen cities of Grozny, Gudermes and Malgobek.

Israilov’s plan was to launch a general insurrection in autumn 1941, to speed the German advance into the region. But the Moscow counter-offensive stalled the German advance for several months, and the insurrection was set instead for 10 January 1942. The planned insurrection never came to pass — largely owing to the further delay of the German advance, and the lack of effective communications to coordinate the hundreds of guerrilla units spread throughout the region. Evidently, the mountainous terrain that stymied an effective and coordinated rapid Soviet counter-insurgency effort likewise undermined a unified insurgency movement: communications between guerrilla units were too slow and unreliable to sustain a unified, coordinated rapid strike force. Soviet bombing raids twice attacked suspected mountain hideouts of Chechen guerrillas in Spring 1942, but mountain guerrillas escaped the sustained air attacks virtually unscathed.\(^{85}\)

All the same, the planned insurrection gave impetus to numerous small uprisings against Soviet power. Military historian V.P. Galitskii has estimated that by the end of 1941 there were small armed bands of 7–15 guerrillas in virtually every Chechen village.\(^{86}\) Typical were events in Khulokha (in Nachka village soviet, Galanchozh raion) where, on 21 October 1941, locals rose up against Soviet power and pillaged the stores of the collective farm. Heavily armed, they subsequently repelled a Soviet armed unit sent to quash the uprising.

Weak in central administration or organization, Israilov’s efforts nonetheless offered a plan for non-cooperation with Soviet authority that spread like wildfire throughout the Northern Caucasus by the end of 1941. On 28 January 1942 Israilov formed the Special Party of Caucasus Brothers (OPKB), adopting the symbol of the eagle (the Caucasus) against a backdrop of a shining sun (freedom) with 11 golden beams, symbolizing the 11 dominant ethnic groups of the Caucasus. Their aim? A pan-Islamic ‘armed struggle with Bolshevik barbarism and Russian despotism’.\(^{87}\) Eventually, the organization boasted a membership of more than 5000 in the ‘National Socialist Party of Caucasus Brothers’ (NSPKB), and comprised at least 250 villages and towns in Chechnya alone.\(^{88}\)

Perhaps even more effective than liberationist ideology were the NSPKB’s tactics for battling the Soviets. In June 1942, two key leaders in the Israilov movement — M. Basaev and G. Dzhangireev — were arrested by the Soviet political police (NKVD). The instruction that followed their arrest became the

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\(^{85}\) Sergei I. Linets, ‘Severnyi Kavkaz nakanune i v period nemetsko-fashistskoi okkupatsii’, (Piatigorsk, Diss. kan. ist. nauk, 2003), 353.


\(^{87}\) GARF, f. R-9478, op. 1, d. 55, ll. 87–8.

\(^{88}\) Ibid., ll. 344–51.
watchword for imposing rigid clandestinity on mountain guerrillas who typically resisted military discipline:

- Brutally avenge the enemies for the blood of our native brothers, the best sons of the Caucasus;
- Mercilessly annihilate seksoy [secret agents], agents and other informants of the NKVD;
- Categorically forbid [guerrillas] to spend the night in homes or villages without the security of reliable guards.\(^8^9\)

Such strategic lessons learned early in the war helped Hassan Israilov to survive far longer than many of his associates or rivals.

**Maibrek Sheripov**

After Hassan Israilov, the most influential Chechen guerrilla leader of the second world war was Maibrek Sheripov. Born in 1905 to the family of a tsarist officer, Sheripov came from a distinguished communist family in Chechnya. His elder brother Aslanbek had been a tsarist officer who in 1917 opted to join the Reds and enjoyed a distinguished career as a Soviet officer in the Civil War. Following in his brother’s footsteps, Maibrek Sheripov joined the Communist Party in the 1930s, and served (at the start of the war) as the president of the Checheno-Ingush ASSR lumber works. His service was interrupted in 1938 when he was arrested for nationalist activities, but he was released from Soviet prison in early 1939, ostensibly because of a lack of evidence, but probably because of family intervention and a few well-placed bribes.\(^9^0\)

As Sheripov explained when he deserted to the Germans in autumn 1941: ‘My brother, Sheripov Aslanbek, foresaw the overthrow of the tsar in 1917, and therefore he began to fight on the side of the Bolsheviks. I likewise know that Soviet power has come to an end, and therefore I want to go to meet the Germans’.\(^9^1\) Using his broad range of family and personal contacts, Sheripov formed the Chechen Mountain National Socialist Underground Organization (ChGNSPO), uniting roving Chechen bands, deserters, escaped criminals, and others on the territories of Shatoi, Cheberloi, and Itum-Kale raions under the banner of Islamic fundamentalism.\(^9^2\)

The Soviet move against Sheripov was grounded in a well-planned deception operation to compromise Sheripov’s reputation within his own community. NKVD units were in autumn 1942 instructed not to kill Sheripov’s guerrillas, but instead to take all efforts to capture them alive. Then, in the course of interrogations, NKVD officers boasted that they had learned details about the subject through Sheripov himself, suggesting none too subtly that Sheripov himself, suggesting none too subtly that Sheripov

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\(^9^1\) As quoted from Sheripov’s main file in the Arkhiv FSB, published in Galitskii, ‘Velikaia otechestvennaia voina 1941–1945 gg.,’, 20.
was a Soviet spy. While informants inside the prison persuaded the NKVD that Sheripov’s own men now had come to believe they had been betrayed by Sheripov himself, the key lay in communicating details of Sheripov’s alleged treachery to guerrillas outside of the prison who would be willing and able to act on the information. Toward this end, two of Sheripov’s key lieutenants — Machek Baisaev and Khamzatov — were allowed visits from their wives. The outraged women quickly spread the rumours about Sheripov’s alleged treachery, which effectively destroyed Sheripov’s ability to act clandestinely within his native territory. His whereabouts betrayed by once-loyal Chechens, the nationalist Sheripov was killed as a suspected traitor to his own people on 7 November 1942. The timing of his murder corresponded with Sheripov’s decision to unite his forces with those of Hassan Israilov, which if successful might have posed a serious threat to Soviet interests in the Northern Caucasus.

Osman Saidurov (aka ‘Colonel’ Osman Gube)

As negotiations for unification had opened between the two key guerrilla movements in the Northern Caucasus, Hassan Israilov sent an emissary to the Germans requesting recognition and support for his army. In response, the Germans sent ‘Colonel’ Osman Gube.

An Avar by nationality, Osman Gube was born Osman Saidurov in 1892 in Buinaksk raion of Dagestan, where from 1915 he had served as a soldier in the Dagestan regiment of the Caucasus National Division. His unit joined Denikin’s army in 1919, and in 1921 Gube emigrated from Georgia to Trabzon (Turkey), and soon after to Istanbul. From Istanbul, Gube took an active part in supporting work dedicated to the liberation of the Caucasus from the Soviet Union.

Legitimized as a reliable operative following his anti-Soviet activities in the 1920s, Saidurov-Gube became a member of the Northern Caucasus section of the anti-Soviet émigré organization ‘Caucasus’ in 1934, where he soon drew the attention of the Abwehr, German military intelligence. Driven by their eagerness to gain control of Soviet oil through the Northern Caucasus, the German Abwehr in the mid-1930s recruited en masse the nationalist organization ‘Caucasus’, whose offices were relocated from Paris to Berlin. Recruited in 1937 by an Abwehr talent scout, the Kumuk director of ‘Caucasus’ Haydar Bammat, Saidurov was ordered to change his name to Osman Gube. Soon

95 Ibid., 43. Three key figures assisted the Germans in talent-spotting for the Northern Caucasus: Haydar Bammat (Kumuk), Ali Han Kantemirov (Ossetian) and Michel Kedia, head of the RSHA’s Georgian Desk. In the central and southern Caucasus, similar roles were played by A. Alibekov (Alibekoff) in Azerbaijan and A. Diamalian (Djamalian) in Armenia. On the RSHA, see Michael Wildt, Generation des Unbedingten. Das Führungskorps des Reichssicherheitshaupt-
after, Gube was sent via Istanbul to his native home in Daghestan to prepare fifth columnist networks for the Germans in the Northern Caucasus. Little is known of Gube’s work between 1938 and 1941, though he spent some of this time in Germany training to become a member of the political police in the future German-occupied Caucasus.

After the start of the German–Soviet war, Gube was sent by the Abwehr to complete a course in the German espionage school at Stettin. By mid-1942, he was attached to an Abwehr airborne division. Gube, who held no rank before August 1942, had been given the rank of ‘colonel’ at the last minute, in an Abwehr effort to show the enormous respect they had for the Caucasus movement.

Abwehr Lieutenant Gert Reichert was dropped with 11 others into the mountainous southern region of Chechnya at 2200 hours on the night of 25 August 1942. Among the German-trained guerrillas on his team were ‘Colonel’ Osman Gube, and four other guerrillas from the Northern Caucasus. All were former POWs, and all had been hand-picked by Osman Gube: a 45-year-old Lakets from Kazikumuk raion, Daghestan, Ali Ramazanov; another Daghestani, 35-year-old Daud Gasanov; and two Chechens: 30-year-old Akhmed Batalov, from Shali raion, and Salman Agaev, who had served as a parachutist-saboteur in the Red Army before being captured in the Crimea in 1942 and recruited by the Abwehr.

In the months leading up to the German invasion of the North Caucasus region, hundreds of POWs from the Caucasus had been recruited from German camps and trained by the Abwehr to work as agents behind Soviet lines. Code-named Operation Shamíl, after the notorious nineteenth-century rebel leader, their objective was to organize insurrections behind Soviet lines, and to destabilize Soviet communications and transport. Some 200 Abwehr-trained parachutists were dropped into the Karachai Autonomous Region, 92 into the Kabardin-Balkar Autonomous Region, and 77 into Chechnya-Ingushetia.

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The best summary of German Abwehr operations in the Caucasus during the war is an unpublished typescript totalling some 44 sheets found in the unpublished private papers of German Caucasus expert Gerhard von Mende, ‘Das Unternehmen Mainz’, Parts 1 and 2 [no date]. I am grateful to Erling von Mende (Berlin) for generously sharing copies of these invaluable materials [hereafter cited as Mende, ‘Das Unternehmen Mainz’].


98 On German support for rebel bands behind Soviet lines in the Caucasus and Central Asia, see Patrik von zur Mühlen, Zwischen Hakenkreuz und Sowjetstern: Der Nationalismus der sowjet-
This was part of a broader programme for infiltrating German agents behind Soviet lines. In all, the Germans operated more than 130 special intelligence, sabotage and counter-intelligence units on the Eastern Front, staffed by thousands of recruits taken primarily from anti-Soviet émigré communities and POW camps. These recruits were trained in approximately 60 special schools organized by the Abwehr and the SD (the Sicherheitsdienst, the German Security Service).99

In Chechnya-Ingushetia, five groups (56 persons) were dropped behind Soviet lines in July–August 1942 to facilitate the German advance; three more groups (20 persons) were dropped in August 1943 to slow the Soviet counter-offensive.100

July–August 1942
- Senior Lieutenant Lange: 30
- Junior Lieutenant Reichert: 12
- ‘Colonel’ Osman Gube: 5
- Ossetian Dzugaev: 5
- Ossetian Zosiev: 4

August 1943
- Ingush Khamchiev: 8
- Ingush Khautiev: 6
- Chechen Selimov: 6

The ethnic breakdowns of the units illustrate the core bases of German native support: Germans 15; Kabardintsy 3; Chechens 13; Georgians 2; Ossetians 21; Russians 1; Ingushi 16; Cossacks 1; Daghestanis 5.101

It is clear from available documents that the Germans made concerted efforts to reach an agreement with Hassan Israilov. But Israilov’s persistent refusal to cede control of his revolutionary movement to the Germans, and his insistence on German recognition of Chechen statehood, marked him among the Germans as unreliable, a ‘dreamer’, his programme for mobilizing a free
people’s insurrection in the Caucasus a ‘foolish illusion’. Here as elsewhere, the Germans refused to recognize autonomous anti-Soviet insurrectionary movements with nationalist ends different from their own. In this way, German views of nationalist insurrectionary movements mirrored Soviet perspectives: such movements were important only as weapons against foreign enemies.

But German reluctance to provide full support to Israilov’s drive for Chechen independence did not preclude covert operations to exploit Chechen fighters for specific operations: reconnaissance on Soviet troop movements; partisan strikes against Soviet objects — Grozny oil and gas stores, key bridges, communications and transport routes.

So that even as ‘Colonel’ Osman Gube’s efforts to forge a German–Chechen alliance through Israilov were flailing, other members of the Reichert sabotage team enjoyed greater success. ‘Colonel’ Osman Gube never managed to put together an army of his own; little more than four months after he was dropped behind Soviet lines into the Northern Caucasus, Gube was apprehended in a special Soviet operation on the night of 12 January 1943 near village Akki-Yurt.

Rasul Sakhabov

If German support for indigenous independence movements within the Northern Caucasus was limited through mid-1943, German support for their own agents in the field was quite extensive. Dropped with Abwehr Lieutenant Gert Reichert into Chechnya in August 1942, Abwehr-trained Chechen guerrilla Rasul Sakhabov enjoyed enormous success. Sakhabov was instructed to provoke a mass uprising in his native territory, focusing his activities in the villages of Sel’mantuzen and Makhketa in Vedeno raion. Working for nearly a month to ignite an insurrection in the zone, Sakhabov received considerable German air support — including 10 arms shipments that contained more than 500 weapons, 10 heavy machine guns and substantial ammunition. With the help of Islamic religious leaders, the team managed to recruit more than 400
guerrillas for rear actions against the Soviets in Vedeno and Cheberloi 
raions.\textsuperscript{105}

Declassified Soviet police sources reveal that the German provocations had 
a telling effect on the frequency of popular uprisings in the region. In the 
course of September–October 1942, the NKVD liquidated 41 armed groups 
in southern Chechnya, killing more than 400 rebels and capturing (through 
surrender or arrest) another 60 ‘bandits’.\textsuperscript{106}

But German support brought its own risks. The details of Sakhabov’s liqui-
dation reveal a lot about Soviet counter-insurgency methods in such hostile 
borderland zones during the war. In this operation, Soviet state security 
recruited a proxy from within the Chechen guerrilla leadership, one Ramazan 
Magonadov. Keenly aware that the declining fortunes of the Germans in the 
east following Stalingrad had driven many guerrillas to seek a rapprochement 
with the Soviets, officers from the elite Soviet counter-insurgency unit, the 
Main Directorate for the Struggle against Banditry, managed to initiate contact 
with Magonadov through the influential Islamic leader Gaisomov. Their 
offer? Complete amnesty for Magonadov and his family in return for a 
favour: that he assassinate Sakhabov. The pitch was not altogether without 
foundation, since it was well known that Magonadov had sworn a blood feud 
against Sakhabov for killing his brother Saaduly; here, as so often, the Soviets 
sought to exploit dissension among the Chechens to their own ends.\textsuperscript{107}

Magonadov agreed to Soviet terms. In October 1942, working with two other 
guerrillas who were also cooperating with the Soviets in return for amnesty, 
Magonadov managed to lure Sakhabov into an ambush, where Sakhabov was 
cut down with tommy-guns.\textsuperscript{108} Soon after, 32 members of Sakhabov’s band 
were killed or captured, Abwehr Lieutenant Reichert was killed, and the 
Ossetian head of another German sabotage group, Dzugaev, had also been 
arrested.

\textit{Sarali Makhmudov}

Village teacher Sarali Makhmudov was born in 1911 in village Germenchuk, 
Shali raion. Twice sentenced to five years in Soviet prisons for anti-Soviet 
political activity, Makhmudov managed to escape in 1937. From that time, he 
formed an armed band that for the next seven years eluded Soviet authorities,


\textsuperscript{106} Ibid., 13.

\textsuperscript{107} Saaduly Magonadov had been a powerful guerilla leader in his own right. According to a 
Soviet police report, he and his band (active since 1920) had been directly responsible for the mur-
der of at least 30 people since the early 1930s, mainly for the execution of agents of Soviet power. 
The band of Saaduly Magonadov periodically united with units of Sarali Makhmudov for joint 
operations. See GARF, R-9478, op. 1, d. 2, ll. 3–4.

\textsuperscript{108} On the Soviet deception operation to assassinate Sakhabov, see Galitskii, ‘Velikaia otech-
while leaving a wake of violent raids on Soviet objects, murders, armed robbery and terrorist attacks. His main base of operations was in Chechnya’s mountainous south-eastern zone, consisting of seven raions of the Checheno-Ingush ASSR: Shali, Vedeno, Kurchaloi, Gudermes, Atagi, Nozhai-Yurt and Grozny raions.109

In 1942, as the German front moved into the Northern Caucasus, Sarali Makhmudov, his closest associate, Betirsolt Temir-Sultanov, and their band of 150 heavily armed guerrillas connected with a German Abwehr unit to organize an armed rebellion in the Soviet rear, concentrated in Vedeno and Shali raions. Receiving weapons and supplies in carefully coordinated German air drops, the guerrilla unit provided considerable support assisting German assault teams to strike behind Soviet lines.

Well-informed of Makhmudov’s operations, special Soviet teams of 15 operations groups managed to arrest or liquidate 23 members of his band in 1941 alone, but local support for the band kept growing, and Makhmudov and his associates repeatedly eluded Soviet ambush.

By 1943, German fortunes had turned — and Soviet operatives found that numerous ‘bandits’ like Makhmudov, who had previously supported the German war effort, were now inclined to ‘legalize’ and help the Soviets in exchange for amnesty. Soviet security files include notes on several meetings of NKVD personnel directly with Makhmudov and Temir-Sultanov in 1943. The NKVD found Makhmudov open to cooperation, but he persistently refused to betray his German associates.

In November 1943, operating through their ‘Agent 59’ (Georgian émigré leader Michael Kedia, who by then had become coordinator of all German parachutist operations into the Caucasus zones under Operation Zeppelin) the Soviets recruited a German-trained parachutist, a native Georgian, code-named ‘Arsen’. Until August 1943, ‘Arsen’ had been deeply embedded in Makhmudov’s main camp, along with German Abwehr officers Senior Lieutenant Leonard Chetvergas and radio-operator Hans Schäffer. From August to November 1943, ‘Arsen’ was allegedly working to locate and support German parachutist units in Soviet Georgia.

On 8 November 1943, ‘Arsen’ was instructed by his Soviet handlers to return to Makhmudov’s camp (alleging that he had failed to locate the targeted diversionary units). He was to inform his Chechen and German associates that he had located in Georgia a contact who could help the Germans pass through Soviet lines and reach safe haven in neutral Turkey.

Makhmudov and Temir-Sultanov supported the arrangement, and even paid 4000 roubles for counterfeit documents for Chetvergas and Schäffer. In early December, ‘Arsen’ approached the Germans with a note of concern and warned them about Makhmudov’s ongoing negotiations with the Soviets.

advising them to protect themselves from imminent betrayal. The Germans agreed, and on the night of 6 December their former hosts — Sarali Makhmudov and Betirsolt Temir-Sultanov — were murdered in a nearby forest. Then, they took a Soviet-provided transport into a safe apartment in Grozny, where ‘Arsen’ got the two Germans drunk. Two nights later, the two Germans were too drunk to resist arrest.110

With their capture, the German threat to Chechnya was ended.

The ‘Chechevitsa’

Although any serious German threat to the Northern Caucasus had ended by the close of 1943, the experiences of the preceding years had taught the Stalinist leadership just how vulnerable Soviet fuel reserves could be: the isthmus that linked northern Iran and European Russia was too strategically vital to leave vulnerable to attack from the south through the Middle East, from the west through Turkey, and above all from within by separatist movements, who could serve as fifth columnists in the event of another war. Initially prepared in late 1943, the ‘Chechevitsa’ — the plan to deport the entire indigenous population of the Northern Caucasus to Central Asia — was carried out from mid-February until mid-March 1944. The People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs, Lavrentii Beria, personally travelled to Grozny on 20 February to supervise the operation.111 According to the secret decree of the Supreme Soviet dated 7 March 1944, ‘On the Liquidation of the Checheno-Ingush ASSR and the Administrative Reorganization of the Territory’, the reason for the forced deportation was the alleged mass collaboration of the indigenous peoples of the Northern Caucasus with the Germans. This despite the fact that only a small part of Checheno-Ingushetia was actually ever occupied by the Germans, or that some 157,000 vainakhi — ‘our own people’ of the Caucasus — had served honourably in the war against the Germans. In the Stalinist mindset, the Chechen people were a ‘bandit nation’, a nation of fifth columnists, guilty — in Lavrentii Beria’s words — of ‘active and almost

110 Caucasus recruits were generally deemed ‘untrustworthy’ and an ‘embarrassment’ among German soldiers and of questionable reliability among both the Germans and Soviets. This reputation for untrustworthiness made it easier for the Soviets to sow dissension in enemy ranks. For an informative series of raw reports, see ‘Kavkaz 1942. 1942–1943 gody: geroizm i predatel’stvo’, Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal 8 (1991), 35–43.
universal participation in the terrorist movement directed against the Soviets and the Red Army'.  

In connection with the fact that during the period of the Patriotic War many Chechens and Ingush betrayed the Motherland, crossed over to the side of the fascist occupiers, joined the ranks of saboteurs and spies, were dropped by the Germans in the rear of the Red Army, that under German orders they created armed bands for the struggle against Soviet power, and also considering that many Chechens and Ingush have for years taken part in armed actions against Soviet power and over the course of an extended time, while not engaging in honourable labour, they have perpetrated bandit raids on collective farms in neighbouring districts, robbed and murdered Soviet citizens . . . 

The Chechevitsa operation began without warning on the night of 23–4 February 1944. Over the next two weeks, some 19,000 staff officers of the Soviet political and military police (NKVD, NKGB and Smersh), and approximately 100,000 officers and soldiers of NKVD military units, deported 478,479 persons — 387,229 Chechens and 91,250 Ingushis. Throughout the six-week period from mid-February to the end of March 1944, the indigenous peoples of the Northern Caucasus were forcibly removed from their native lands. In all, 602,193 persons were deported from the region: 496,460 Chechens and Ingushis, 68,327 Karachaevtsy and 37,406 Balkars. The Checheno-Ingush ASSR was abolished and restructured into administrative districts of four surrounding republics, their territories re-settled with ‘reliable’ ethnic Russians and ethnic Georgians.

Almost all published accounts of the Chechevitsa emphasize the orderliness and efficiency of the operation. The foremost historian of the events, N.F. Bugai, estimated that a mere 50 Chechen lives were lost during the forcible
deportation of nearly half a million men, women, children, and elderly. But in light of the hatred and passionate desire for vengeance that motivated the Soviet police action, such benign accounts strain credulity. Eyewitness reports of Chechens who were present during the relocations, supplemented by accounts of remorseful perpetrators, and subsequent forensic investigations, challenge the aura of benignity that surrounds the action. We know, for instance, that Beriia had issued a verbal order that any Chechen or Ingush considered ‘untransportable (netransportabel’nyi) should be liquidated’ on the spot. Under the rubric of ‘untransportability’, thousands were brutally killed. The most glaring example of numerous reports of Soviet excesses was the Soviet annihilation of the Chechen mountain village Khaibakh, in Shatoi raion, where more than 700 Chechens were locked in a stable and burned alive. Here and elsewhere throughout the Northern Caucasus, the probable cause of ‘untransportability’ was typhus, which had broken out in epidemic proportions in villages throughout the region. There are also reliable reports of dead bodies strewn throughout the villages and roads of the Northern Caucasus during and after the action; of the burning of priceless Chechen books and manuscripts, and the destruction of Chechen-language libraries; of the poisoning of food and water supplies to liquidate any guerrillas who remained behind.

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117 The Soviet commander of the annihilation of Khaibakh, Colonel Gvishiani, reported the incident of 23 February 1944 directly to Beriia: ‘Only for your eyes. In view of [their] “untransportability” and with the goal of the strict and timely fulfillment of operation “Gory” [Mountains] we were forced to liquidate more than 700 inhabitants in Khaibakh settlement’. Beriia’s response was to praise Gvishiani ‘for resolute action’, and to nominate him for a medal and a promotion. See the account in Zaindi Shakhbiev, Sud’ba checheno-ingushskogo naroda (Moscow 1996), 249–55. Limited documentation from Soviet archives confirms that more than 700 Chechens were killed in Khaibakh, but the details of the massacre have not yet been released. Cf. the mainstream Russian account from journalist Ol’ga Timofeeva, ‘Naselennogo punkta “Khaibakh” v Checheno-Ingushskoi ASSR net. V 1944 godu v koniushne vysokogornogo aula Khaibakh byli zazhivo sozhzheny 705 chelovek’, Izvestiia 48 (18 March 2004), 5. A detailed account of the massacre from an eyewitness, Deputy Commissar of Justice in Chechnya Dziyaudin Mal’sagov, appeared in M. Arsenov, ‘It Was Like That . . .’, Chechen Times 2 February 2003. Mal’sagov puts Gvishiani in command at the scene of the massacre, acting under orders received directly from Lavrentii Beriia.

118 This version is confirmed by the extraordinary eyewitness account of Akhmad Mudarov, an inhabitant of the nearby village Roshni-chu. Mudarov and seven of his family members who were sick with typhus were shot down by Soviet police, but Mudarov managed to recover from his wounds. See Said Bitsoev, ‘V menia vonzili shtyk i podtashchili k obryvu’, Novye Izvestiia 31 (24 February 2004), 7. In his final report on the deportations to Stalin in July 1944, Beriia indicated that the struggle to contain typhus had been ‘unsatisfactory’, and that upon arrival at their destinations in Kazakhstan, there were numerous outbreaks of typhus among Chechen deportees.

119 See the tendentious summary of Lyoma Usmanov, a professor in the Defense Language Institute of the US Defense Department, ‘The 1944 Deportation’, Chechen Times 28 (13 February 2004). Usmanov estimates that more than 7000 Chechens were massacred during the Chechevitsa in Galanchozh raion alone. There is solid evidence that Chechen resistance continued well after the mass deportation to Kazakhstan. See, for instance, the reports from NKVD General Egnarov to Beriia in 1945 from Alma-Ata, GARF, f. 9401, op. 2, d. 92, ll. 98, 119–120.
Although the action was presented to the Soviet public as punishment for alleged Chechen treachery during the second world war, the Chechevitsa was first and foremost a tactical operation directed against armed separatists who still seriously undermined Soviet normalization of the region. According to the NKVD, some 6544 Chechens and Ingushi resisted deportation, 338 of whom were killed in battles with Soviet forces in late February and early March. At that time, the NKVD arrested 2016 Chechens and Ingushi as members of the local ‘anti-Soviet element’; and police confiscated 20,072 weapons — including 4868 rifles, and 479 machine guns and Tommy guns.

At the time of the launch of the Chechevitsa in mid-February 1944, at least eight organized armed bands of Chechen guerrillas were still at large. By June, the Soviet police enlisted the support of Muslim religious leaders to ensure the cooperation of those few ‘bandits’ who remained. Among the Chechen units still at large was the largest band and its most influential Chechen guerrilla leader, Hassan Israilov, who had managed to evade the Soviets for more than three years. Stripped by the mass deportation of his partisan base of support, Israilov was rendered extremely vulnerable to capture.

There were several near misses. In early February 1944, the Soviets received intelligence that Israilov was being hidden by one Dzhovatkhan Murtazaliev, his brother Ayub, and his son Khas-Magomed at a hidden location in Itum-Kale raion. The Soviets secretly apprehended the Murtazaliev brothers on 13 February. In the course of interrogation, Ayub disclosed that Israilov was hiding in a cave in the mountain of Bachi-Chu, near Dzumsoev village soviet in Itum-Kale raion. On the night of 14–15 February, a special NKVD team led by officer of state security Tseretel’ and guided by Ayub Murtazaliev entered and searched the cave. While Israilov had again eluded capture by departing minutes before the arrival of the Soviet team, the operation was a huge success.

Search of the cave turned up several trophies, including Israilov’s own personal DP (Degtiareva) light machine-gun and ammunition, an English-made sniper rifle, an Iranian-made rifle, a Russian-made .375 rifle, more than 200 rounds of ammunition, and Israilov’s personal archive, more than 2 kg of papers that gave the Soviets intimate knowledge of Israilov’s insurrectionary movement. Intelligence gleaned from the archive included a comprehensive list of members of the NSPKB still at large in more than 20 auls or mountain villages in Itum-Kale, Galanchozh, Shatoi and Prigorodnyi raions — in all, 6540 persons. The cache also included a detailed German map identifying the locations of NSPKB underground cells throughout the Northern Caucasus.120

Keenly aware that he had been duped by Ayub Murtazaliev, Tseretel’ pressed him for Israilov’s whereabouts. Eventually, Murtazaliev confessed that Israilov had fled to the cave of his nephew, Khas-Magomed Murtazaliev. But by the time Tseretel’ and his team had managed to apprehend Khas-Magomed on 15 February, Israilov’s trail had run cold.

Hassan Israilov spent the last 10 months of his life a fugitive from Soviet law, crushed by the weight of the deportation of his people from their native homeland, desperately moving from cave to cave to avoid capture. Until the release of Israilov’s master file from the archives of the Russian Federal Security Service, we will not know how he spent these last days of his life. On 26 November 1944 Soviet state security officers apprehended one Isbakhiev, who was just returning from a meeting with Israilov. Among his communications was found a personal request addressed to Israilov’s old nemesis, the NKVD Chief of Grozny, V.A. Drozdov, to plead directly to Stalin for clemency in his case. In the note, Israilov also requested supplies of paper and pencils, medicine for treating tuberculosis, and a copy of one of Stalin’s reports. He also asked about the fate of his brothers, Hussein and Osman.121

The details of Hassan Israilov’s end are still unknown. All we have is a Top Secret communication from Kakuchaia and Drozdov to Deputy Director of the NKVD Kruglov, dated 29 December 1944, that ‘Comrade Beriia’s assignment has been completed. Israilov Hassan has been killed, his corpse identified and photographed’.122

The Chechen armed resistance did not end with Israilov’s demise. Special counter-insurgency units of the Soviet secret police would continue to hunt the remnants of Chechen guerrilla opposition in the Northern Caucasus until 1953.

Throughout the period from June 1941 to November 1943, Soviet special units in the Northern Caucasus liquidated two large organized guerrilla movements — the followers of Khasan Israilov and Maibrek Sheripov — and 46 smaller mountain separatist guerrilla groups with an estimated total of 980 armed members.123 The record for the entire wartime period is even more telling. According to GUBB data, in the period between 1940 and 1944 the struggle of Soviet state security against Chechen and Ingush nationalist guerrillas in the Northern Caucasus brought the annihilation of 197 organized bands, consisting of 4532 guerrillas: 657 were killed; 2762 captured; and 1113 persuaded to surrender.124

According to data from GUBB for the entire Soviet Union, armed anti-Soviet and nationalist insurgent elements posed a grave threat to Soviet security: from 1941 to 1944 there were active on Soviet territory some 7160 small band formations, composed of more than 54,000 armed members. Known ‘bandit’ groups in the Northern Caucasus region were especially numerous: in Stavropol 109; Chechnya-Ingushetia 54; Kabardino-Balkaria 47; Kalmyks 12. Throughout the German–Soviet war, deserters and those avoiding military

122 Quoted in Loginov, Kavkazskie orly, 61.
124 GARF, f. R-9478, op. 1, d. 274, l. 1.
service swelled these bandit groups to over 1.6 million members: in Ukraine, 128,527 members; in the North Caucasus region, 62,751; in Stavropol, 18,154; in Moldavia, 5209; in Belorussia, 4406; and in the Crimea, 279.125

The experience of the war would confirm the Soviet leadership’s worst fears about potential fifth columnists: Stalinism bred disaffection, and disaffection created fertile ground for organized anti-Soviet opposition supported by foreign enemies. This perspective would become a permanent feature of Soviet national security policy. In the second world war, nationalist armed collaboration was common in zones throughout the Soviet western and southern borderlands, eventually accounting for 2.5 million of 3 million armed collaborators with German occupying authorities in Europe. By 1945, one in eight German soldiers had been a Soviet citizen before the war.126

Soviet post-war policy in her southern tier — the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Near East — would build on Soviet experience of the previous decade, a period that forced the fundamental re-orientation of Soviet strategic planning from the Far East to the Caucasus and the Middle East. The third world war nearly broke out twice within 18 months of the close of the second world war: in March 1946, when the Soviets sent hundreds of tanks into northern Iran; and again in summer and autumn 1946, when the Soviets pushed to the brink of war with Turkey.127 In both instances, the vulnerability of the vitally important oil fields and refineries of the Soviet Caucasus to British and American air attack demanded an escalated Soviet commitment to the defence of her south-

126 Antony Beevor, The Fall of Berlin, 1945 (New York 2002), 110–14; Richard Overy, Russia’s War: Blood Upon the Snow (New York 1997), 107, 162, 361. On Soviet Muslims who served the Germans during the second world war, see Roman’ko, Musul’manskie legioni vo Vtoroi mirovoi voine.

ern frontier. In the West, the Soviet escalation was perceived as a threat to vital British and American interests in the Middle East and South Asia; so that, as Eduard Mark has observed, ‘Soviet pressures on Iran and (especially) on Turkey led the Truman administration to designate the Near East a region so vital to American security as to be worth a world war’. Internally, the Soviet post-war struggle to normalize would be profoundly redefined by the dawn of the Cold War: an escalation of Stalinist policing in the form of the Zhdanovshchina — the open attack against potential fifth columnists.

What were the root causes of Soviet insecurities in the Caucasus in mid-1945? Over the past several years, largely as a result of PL 105–246, the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act of 8 October 1998, the US intelligence establishment has begun to unlock some of the mysteries of the early Cold War. While we are far from knowing the full story of the radical realignment of US commitments to Turkey and the Middle East by the end of 1946, this much we do know. The headquarters of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) — America’s wartime intelligence agency — in Istanbul, Turkey, was closing down in autumn 1944, when on 27 December 1944 Joseph T. Curtiss, Yale class of 1923, officially an Assistant Professor of English on leave to build Yale’s Collection of War Literature, but actually serving as the acting X-2 in Istanbul, sent a flash coded message to Washington under the subject heading: ‘The Turkish Desire for Future Collaboration with the American Intelligence Service’. The proposal? The Turks were pushing hard for close Turkish–American relations, for substantial American economic and military aid, and for a solid American defence commitment:

128 Eduard Mark’s summary of British and American plans for air and naval attacks on the Caucasus oil fields and refineries seem far more realistic than the rosy estimates in Operation Pike (1939–1940):

They calculated that if sustained operations began from Britain by D+90 days and from Egypt by D+120 to D+150 days [after the launch of the Soviet attack on Turkey], the B-29s could destroy 70–80 percent of the Soviet Union’s capacity to refine petroleum by D+240 at a cost of 39,000 tons of bombs and 151 aircraft. An additional month would be required to achieve the same effect if the Superfortresses simultaneously undertook to mine the Black and Caspian Seas with 10,000 tons of mines in order to hinder the transportation of petroleum from the Caucasian oil fields to the refineries (Mark, ‘The War Scare of 1946 and Its Consequences’, 406).

129 Ibid., 412.

1. During an interview which occurred between AH/005 [Joseph T. Curtiss] and AH/901 [Nuri Pasha?] the subject of the forthcoming return of AH/001 [John Maxson] to Washington was mentioned. AH/901 [Nuri Pasha?] emphatically stated that in the opinion of the Turks it was not only desirable but imperative that the American intelligence service in Turkey should be made permanent and be established on a broader basis. This same opinion was expressed by AH/900 [Chief of the Emniyet, the Turkish secret police, Mehmet Naci Perkel?] to AH/001 [John Maxson] and AG/009 [Turner 'Tolly' Smith, X-2, Cairo].

2. This matter seemed to AH/005 [Joseph T. Curtiss] of such importance that he discussed the question with the Chief of Mission and at his request we are submitting this memorandum although the problem is one which concerns not only X-2 but the mission as a whole.131

Curtiss further emphasized the ideal conditions that facilitated post-war intelligence and operational work in Turkey:

It cannot be too strongly impressed on those not immediately familiar with the Turkish scene that X-2 and American intelligence in general can and should make use of the unique opportunity which exists in Turkey for collaboration in the future with the Turkish Police. Their facilities for gathering information are extraordinarily good and by proper collaboration with them information can always be at our disposal. There are few places in the world where American intelligence services can function not only with the protection of the local secret police but even with their aid and blessing.132

Keenly aware of the danger of putting his next points into writing, Curtiss separately communicated his main hopes on this new rapprochement between the United States and Turkey: Istanbul would be the perfect base for ‘JE-Land Operations’, covert operations targeting America’s wartime ally, the Soviet Union.133

131 ‘The Turkish Desire for Future Collaboration with the American Intelligence Service’, Memorandum from AH-005 [Joseph Curtiss], Istanbul, Turkey to SAINT [James R. Murphy], Washington, dated 27 December 1944. Note that the original Curtiss memorandum has not yet been released. This text was taken from a memorandum to SAINT, London (JJ-001 only) [Norman Holmes Pearson] from SAINT, Washington (DH-001 [Roger Pfaff] and DH-135 [John McDonough]), dated 23 February 1945, NARA, RG 226, Entry 214, Box 1.

For an informative biography of Joseph Toy Curtiss, see Robin W. Winks, Cloak & Gown: Scholars in the Secret War, 1939–1960 (New York 1987), 116–51. From the days of Lannie McFarland in OSS/Istanbul, Curtiss had been the OSS link to AH/900, the head of the Turkish secret police (Mehmet Naci Perkel [1889–1969]), with whom he formed a close and lasting friendship. See Winks, Cloak & Gown, 137. According to his CIA file, Kedia maintained a close association with several key figures in Turkey, among them Naci Bey, chief of the Turkish Military Intelligence; Djelal Bey, chief of Turkish Intelligence in western Turkey; and Nuri Pasha, a major arms manufacturer.

132 Ibid. Emphasis added.

133 Inevitably, other stations did get wind of the re-orientation of assets towards the Soviets. Months after the operations had begun, on 8 April 1945, X-2/London [Norman Holmes Pearson] fired off an angry message to Washington:

With regard to [Robert] Bishop’s proposal for collaboration with the Turks in Bucharest on information about JE land [the Soviet Union], there have been a few signals passed on which you should be informed. We and Washington both felt that there was great danger in this, and we cabled Istanbul for Bucharest that X-2 must in no way be involved in such activity. Istanbul has replied that the matter did not mean anything new for X-2, but was arranged on
Curtiss and his Istanbul associates were pushing especially hard for one man to lead the group: Michael Kedia, former Chief of the German Georgian Desk in the Kaukatische Verbindungstaub, primary architect of German wartime Caucasus covert operations in Operation Zeppelin and, as we now know, Soviet ‘Agent 59’. Kedia had been recruited by the OSS earlier in autumn 1944 in a special operation, Mission Ruppert, and would subsequently join the growing ranks of Allen Dulles’ ‘Crown Jewels’ — German wartime assets

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*the Chief of Mission level.* Since this raised the possibility that other branches were more in the picture than ours, we have turned the matter over to Washington, reiterating that X-2 *must not be concerned with JE land information* and suggesting that if only SI work is involved, DH/001 [John Maxson] should take the matter up with SI and the hill and issue appropriate instructions. (Emphasis added; Document Number 21033, declassified on 8 September 2003, in Entry 214, Box 1, of RG 226 Records of the Office of Strategic Services, Previously Withheld Documents Transferred By CIA Accession 91–01046R.)

Years later, already back at Yale, Pearson wrote in a private letter dated 6 January 1947:

> It should not be overlooked that Dulles thought of himself as having a private intelligence service which was at best affiliated with OSS. We tried in vain to get details from him of his activities, Paul Blum informed me that no one but Dulles even in SI in Switzerland knew the details of the men [recruited for Dulles’ ‘Crown Jewels’], as he discovered when he was at one time acting in charge during Allen’s absence. I grant that the full significance of the defections as they related to Dulles’ plans was not known to us, but this was because we did not know the plans, not because of any stupidity on our part (Pearson to John Waldron, author of the X-2 sections in the official OSS War Report. NARA, RG 226, Entry 215, Box 1, Document No. 002346/01).

Pearson mistakenly concluded that the initiative to re-focus US intelligence assets in southeastern Europe from late 1944 was solely on the initiative of Major Robert Bishop, X-2 Bucharest, who was relieved of his post in March 1945 for his mental instability, his ‘extreme anti-Russian bias’ and for fabricating agent networks. Eduard Mark followed this same line in his article: ‘The OSS in Romania, 1944–1945: An Intelligence Operation of the Early Cold War’, *Intelligence and National Security* 9(2) (April 1994), 320–44. However, a communication from John Megaw to Major John Thurlow, dated 11 April 1945, confirms that the level of commitment went well beyond ‘L’Affaire Bishop’:

> Both Turner [‘Tolly’ Smith, X-2, Cairo] and I were very interested in your remarks on the intelligence possibilities for SI in this country [Turkey] and were particularly pleased that both John Maxson and Frank Wisner were able to give the Washington office a picture of our situation . . . As you probably know, Maxson, having been here longer than Wisner, was able to establish and maintain very close relations with the Turkish Secret Police, and I am sure that it was always his plan that the Turkish Secret Police could not only be a source of information but that, with their cooperation, our office would be in a position to function with the greatest efficiency. Since Turner has been here, he has been most successful in maintaining this cooperation, and at the present time our office enjoys very close relations with the Turkish Secret Police.

Referring to the implementation of ‘Plan C’ — the formal reorientation of Istanbul office to Soviet targets — Megaw left no doubt regarding the target of intelligence to be collected: ‘As you can imagine, we do receive a considerable amount of intelligence from them [the Turkish Secret Police] both directly and indirectly (I must admit however that some of it is mixed with anti-Russian propaganda), and they seem more than willing to assist us with our various problems which arise from time to time’: NARA, RG226, Entry 214, Box 7.
recruited and re-deployed against the Soviet Union. Kedia came to the OSS offering ‘the use of his Georgian intelligence network, with it’s [sic] outposts allegedly reaching as far as Moscow’. In his four-page letter of recommendation vetting Kedia, addressed to Allen Dulles on 11 May 1945, Abwehr associate Eduard Waetjen, another one of Dulles’ ‘Crown Jewels’, underlined the enormous services Kedia could bring:

134 The details of Kedia’s initial recruitment can be found in his partially declassified CIA file of more than 350 pages: CIA-Kedia File. American Agent ‘Youri’ [Yuri Skarzinski] — recruited in Paris because of his connections with Kedia — was dropped into Germany in autumn 1944, ordered to get to Berlin in order ‘to obtain information on the Sicherheitsdienst, the Reichssicherheitshauptamt, important Nazi personalities, and plans for post-hostilities resistance’. ‘Youri’ left Germany five and a half months later, on 8 April 1945, and was debriefed in Switzerland, where his biggest recruits were Michael Kedia, Gerhard von Mende and several members of the German Caucasus committee: A. Diamalian (Armenia), A. Alibekov (Azerbaijan), Ali Han Kantemir(ov) (Ossetian) and others. ‘Youri’ was a 21-year-old son of White Russian émigrés who had left Russia after the Bolshevik Revolution. Born in Germany in 1924, he had spent most of his life in France. He had worked for the Germans from the summer of 1943 to February 1944 at the Swiss Legation in Berlin in the department handling American affairs. ‘Youri’ was recruited by the OSS in Paris in September 1944. CIA-Kedia File; and the original 4-page operation summary ‘SUBJECT: Mission Ruppert’, from Lt A.E. Jolis to Colonel D.K. Bruce, dated 14 October 1944. NARA, RG226, Document No. 4732/16. I am grateful to Richard Breitman for bringing this document to my attention. While the maximum standard payment for OSS spies dropped behind German lines was $300 a month, ‘Youri’ received $500 a month ‘in view of the hazards of the operation, the potential value of the mission, and the natural expectations of the agent’. ‘Youri’ was dispatched with $10,000 in ‘gifts’ and bribes to help facilitate his mission, including gold louis d’or inserted into the heels of his shoes. It is clear that ‘Youri’ received such preferential treatment because of his special relationship with Kedia: ‘Youri is closely acquainted with a highly placed official of the SD in Berlin. This person is a Georgian who served the Nazis out of his opposition to the Stalin regime. His position is now extremely delicate. He dreads the arrival of the Russian armies, and will undoubtedly grab at any opportunity of being able to show that he helped the Allies’.

On 6 October 1944, Kedia, with Kantemir, Diamalian and Alibekov, collectively sent a letter to Alfred Rosenberg insisting on their readiness to continue in the struggle against Bolshevism, but as a unit subordinate to the Germans and not in any way affiliated to Andrei Vlasov and the Russian Liberation Army. A month later, they again insisted that Russia would remain an enemy of Germany — whether it was led by Stalin, or by Vlasov. See Wildt, Generation des Unbedingten, op. cit.

135 From D85 to SAINT, Washington, SUBJECT: Michael Kedia, Georgian Nationalist, three-page memo dated 30 January 1946. CIA-Kedia File. Kedia was at this time being subjected to intense vetting in Switzerland, where ‘he believed himself being kept in Switzerland by the Americans for some future use’.

Note that the heavily redacted pages of Kedia’s CIA file suggest he fell under a shadow of suspicion by autumn 1945. Kedia seems to have run afoul of Mykola Lebed, a Ukrainian nationalist who was by then coordinating all American guerilla penetration operations into the Soviet Union. Richard Helms summed up the American position best in a memo entitled ‘Kedia and the Georgians’, dated 16 December 1946: ‘Kedia can hardly be in a position to exploit these Turkish contacts more successfully than a direct American-Turkish collaboration’. By 1946 or 1947, guerilla operations in the Caucasus were being handled by Lebed’s deputy, Evhen Stakhiv. On Lebed and US covert guerilla operations in the Soviet Union in the late 1940s, see Burds, The Early Cold War in Soviet West Ukraine, 1944–1948.
1. Kedia, who proved to me to be a good friend of Nuri Pasha in Istanbul, seems to be a person of great decency, strong character, sharp in intelligence and trustworthiness. Knowing him, I think we should give his friends the benefit of the doubt. Knowing these Turkish and Caucasian people myself, I am convinced that we will not find many bad eggs among Kedia’s leading men. Their work was dangerous and without any remuneration (Kedia assures me that he never received a cent from the Nazis, which I, knowing the standpoint of Nuri Pasha and his friends in these matters, believe to be truth).

2. These Caucasians should not be regarded as Quislings; they are more or less in the same position as the Poles, struggling for their independence from the Russians.

3. Kedia, especially if in connection with Nuri Pasha, should be in a position to build up the finest intelligence network in the Caucasus and Central Asia, Persia, India, and the near East, as their followers do not work as paid agents, but for purely patriotic reasons (details can be given in a special memo).136

The proposal, accepted with enthusiasm at the highest levels in Washington, catapulted Curtiss from Acting X-2 to Head of Station in Istanbul, so as to afford him the opportunity to implement his plan.

While there were certainly other important factors in the escalation towards war in the Near and Middle East in 1945 and 1946, the re-orientation of US Intelligence away from the Germans and toward the Soviets must certainly have ranked high on Stalin’s list of concerns. While mainstream historiography argues that US agreements with Turkey followed escalating Soviet aggression against Turkey, the December 1944 Turkish proposal suggests that in fact it was the other way around: US covert agreements with Turkey actually preceded the Soviet escalation.

Incredibly, the main continuity in Soviet intelligence on the Caucasus from 1940 to 1945 lay not in the Soviet Union’s enemies — who were many and various — but in Soviet assets: in Lavrentii Beria’s personal Mingrelian informant, ‘Agent 59’ — Georgian émigré Michael Kedia. From his base in the Istanbul community rich in anti-Soviet intrigue, Kedia would oversee the intelligence on the machinations of the Soviet Union’s foreign enemies in the southern tier from the French and the British in 1940, to Germany and Japan from 1941, and America and Britain from 1944. The one constant throughout these tumultuous years was the Soviet preoccupation with the link between the changing series of foreign enemies and suspected ‘fifth columnists’ at home. And Soviet agent Kedia had reported throughout those years from the very centre of that link.

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